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OVERVIEW
Despite the surge in volatility in financial markets last February, with the consequent 
corrections in traded asset prices, the prevailing economic setting in the closing months 
of 2017 and early 2018 has generally been favourable. 
The global macroeconomic scenario has been characterised by across-the-board growth, 
assisted by a continuing accommodative monetary policy and easy financing conditions. 
The risk premia on the highest-yielding European sovereign bonds, including Spanish 
sovereigns, have evidenced declines linked to the improved credit quality of the issuers. 
Against this favourable economic and financial background, the risks to financial stability 
have, to some extent, been contained. However, latent factors remain in place that might 
alter the current situation. Specifically, the implementation of procyclical fiscal policies in 
some countries, such as the United States, may give rise to the emergence of imbalances 
which, in the case of inflation, may alter expectations about future moves by the monetary 
authorities, and in the case of the external accounts, may escalate the application of 
protectionist measures. This, along with a potential resurgence of geopolitical tensions, 
could reverse the existing situation of confidence, driving up risk premia and changing the 
relaxed state of current financing conditions, with an ultimate impact on both economic 
growth and the stability of the financial system. 
At the close of 2017 the Spanish economy remained on the expansionary path embarked 
on four years earlier, growing by 3.1% in the year as a whole. This expansionary pattern is 
expected to continue, albeit at somewhat more moderate rates. The unemployment rate 
has continued to fall, standing in December at 16.5%, and in this setting the financial 
position of households and firms has continued to improve, with fresh declines both in 
debt and debt burden ratios. 
The progressive improvement in the financial position of Spanish deposit institutions 
seen in recent years continued in 2017. Some qualifications are, however, due since the 
level of total consolidated business fell slightly, by 1.7% compared with the 2016 figure, 
essentially as a result of domestic business. As regards this latter variable, although 
credit to the resident private sector contracted by 1.9% in 2017, for some segments, 
such as consumer credit, positive growth was observed. This expansionary course of 
consumer credit was accompanied by something of a rise – albeit a contained one – in 
non-performing loans. 
Consolidated income exceeded €15 billion in 2017, an increase of some 44% in comparison 
with a year earlier, taking return on equity (ROE) to 6%. However, this figure does not 
include the loss of more than €12 billion recorded by Banco Popular Español as a result of 
its resolution in June 2017. Taking that into account, Spain’s institutions’ income would be 
in the order of €2.7 billion, which is a drop of almost 75% on the 2016 figure. 
In terms of solvency, the total capital ratio and the Tier 1 ratio continued to climb, as for 
the past several years, although the CET1 ratio fell slightly, to 12.7%, some 16 bp below 
the December 2016 figure, marked by the resolution of Banco Popular Español.
1 Key developments
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Identified below are the main factors of risk to the stability of the Spanish financial 
system: 
The risk factors identified coincide with those highlighted in the previous edition of the 
Financial Stability Report (FSR), albeit with certain differences. Specifically the second 
risk has been upgraded from low in the last FSR to medium, given the market sensitivity 
observed, following the recent episode of increased volatility, to certain news items 
affecting the economic growth and inflation outlook. The persistence over time of clearly 
favourable conditions in the financial markets raises doubts as to whether this situation is 
in response to economic fundamentals, or whether the market is simply adopting an over-
complacent approach to risk. It is for these reasons that the second risk has been raised 
to medium.
Also, although the financial tensions surrounding the political situation in Catalonia have 
declined, a possible increase in uncertainty with potentially adverse effects cannot be 
ruled out.
These factors are closely interconnected, so that the materialisation of one may trigger the 
other. Moreover, the risk factors highlighted coincide with those identified by other 
international authorities, as they affect, to a greater or lesser extent, the financial systems 
of our fellow European countries. 
Spanish deposit institutions’ net interest margins in the domestic business remain under 
pressure, as a result of the low level of interest rates, coupled with the decline in business 
volume and the still-high level of non-productive assets on banks’ balance sheets. Chart A 
shows the change in financial revenue and costs and the gradual decline in net interest 
margin in business in Spain. The decline in income generation is partially offset by financial 
costs which have also fallen, although with an increasingly narrow margin for further 
reductions, resulting in a decline in net interest margin. 
One of the potential consequences of this is that institutions may seek alternative 
sources of income that offer higher rates of return but may also entail higher risk. This, 
together with other demand factors, could help explain the momentum observed in 
consumer credit (see Chart B). This is a business segment where non-performance is 
generally relatively high and where guarantees play a smaller part; in consequence, how 
this portfolio and its NPL rates perform should be monitored closely in coming quarters. 
In any event, consumer credit accounts for just 4.8% of total credit to the resident 
private sector.
2  Risk factors
2.1  DOWNWARD PRESSURE
ON BANK PROFITABILITY
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The colours in the table are as follows: green denotes an absence of risk, yellow is low risk, orange is medium risk and red is high risk. The time horizon for which 
????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
1
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2
???????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????ally
in the United States, or in the global macroeconomic outlook, which in this latter case might be triggered by an escalation 
of protectionist measures or the materialisation of geopolitical risks.
TABLE 1RISK FACTORS (a)
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Although pressure on profitability continues to be classified as a medium-level risk factor, 
it is important to highlight the progress made by deposit institutions in recent years to 
reduce the volume of non-productive assets. Thus, the NPL ratio of credit to the resident 
private sector in Spain has fallen back by almost 6 pp from its 2013 peak, with non-
performing loans down in cumulative terms to half the 2013 level (see Chart C). The 
combination of higher economic growth and active management by banks is giving rise to 
a continuous decline in these assets, reflected directly in both the NPL ratio and the 
income statement. 
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While volatility indices soared in financial markets in February (see Chart D), with the 
consequent corrections in traded financial asset prices (especially equities), financial 
conditions have generally remained quite favourable (see Charts E and F). 
In any event, the volatility episode demonstrated the sensitivity of traded asset prices to 
changes in monetary policy expectations or to the extended application of protectionist 
measures, the loss of agents’ confidence and the existence of geopolitical risks. In this 
setting, the risk of a sharp adjustment in financial market valuations would have heightened.
The materialisation of these risks would give rise to a tightening of financial conditions 
which, together with wealth effects, could have a negative impact on growth prospects, 
the sustainability of the liabilities of heavily-indebted sectors and the financial system as a 
whole, with an immediate effect on its future profitability prospects.
Thus, given the low risk premia and the levels reached by some stock market indices, a 
sharp price correction could have worrying consequences. 
As in previous editions of the FSR, the above-mentioned risks are analysed in greater 
detail in the Report, seeking to show their interrelatedness and their impact on the financial 
system, in particular on the business pursued by Spanish deposit institutions, and the 
potential repercussions on their credit risk, profitability and solvency position.
Chapter 3, as in previous editions of the FSR, describes the macroprudential stance 
adopted by the Banco de España in recent months. In particular, the updated map of 
systemic vulnerability indicators is presented, with a description of the latest changes 
therein, together with the macroprudential policy decisions taken on the basis of the 
monitoring of the variables and indicators used.
2.2  POTENTIAL SHARP 
CORRECTION IN FINANCIAL 
ASSET PRICES
3  Macroprudential 
analysis and policy
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1  MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR) and until end-January, 
global financial market conditions maintained the favourable tempo observed in previous 
months against a backdrop of ample liquidity and widespread economic recovery. Stock 
market indices tended to appreciate and even reached all-time highs in some cases, such 
as the United States (Chart 1.1.A), implied volatilities held at very meagre levels and the 
credit spreads on higher-risk debt, such as high-yield corporate bonds and emerging 
economies’ bonds narrowed to historically low values (Chart 1.1.B). The interest rates on 
most developed countries’ government debt posted increases which stepped up from the 
beginning of the year, although they remained at moderate levels (Chart 1.1.C). The dollar 
depreciated across the board against the euro, yen and sterling, as well as against most 
emerging economies’ currencies. This weakening of the dollar seems to have been 
underpinned by a widening of the growth differential between the United States and the 
rest of the world, the existence of “twin deficits” – fiscal and current account – in the US 
economy and it took place despite positive US economic data, higher policy interest rates 
and differentials against other economies (Chart 1.1.D). 
Following a protracted period of calm, in early February there was a sharp correction in 
prices traded on US stock markets in tandem with a robust rise in the implied volatility 
index of the S&P (VIX) which on 5 February recorded its highest daily rise since the stock 
market crash of 1987 (Chart 1.1.E). The trigger for these movements was the publication 
of higher-than-expected wage growth data in the United States which made investors fear 
a higher pace of policy interest rates hikes against a backdrop of growing concern about 
the high valuations of the S&P 500 index, following the substantial appreciation built up 
over recent years, as reflected by some stock-market valuation metrics (see Box 1.1). 
Certain technical factors linked to the larger role of passive investment strategies, the 
growing use of electronic trading platforms and, especially, market operations in volatility 
derivatives 1 may have contributed to the strength of these movements. These markets, 
albeit small, favour the persistence of low volatility in calm periods whereas faced with a 
shock they can amplify movements. 
European stock markets were affected by the contagion of this turmoil, which was followed 
by a sharp rise in volatility and a price correction (Charts 1.1.A and 1.1.E). This contagion 
occurred even though in European markets – unlike in US markets – there was no clear 
evidence of excessive share price valuations, since this was not indicated by any of the 
metrics generally used (see Box 1.1). 
After this episode, the volatilities of stock market indices eased gradually although for the 
VIX it remained at higher levels than those prevailing in the preceding months. These 
indices tended to climb gradually, although at the beginning of March there was another 
correction following the announcement of higher tariffs in the United States. In March and 
April the stock markets were heavily influenced by developments relating to this heightened 
protectionism and by other geopolitical tensions. At the cut-off date of this report, the S&P 
500 stood somewhat above the levels at end-October, while European stock market 
indices were showing losses (the Euro Stoxx 50 was down 4.4%). After performing more 
unfavourably than the euro area average during September and October, largely as a result 
1 For more details, see Box 3 of the Quarterly Report on the Spanish Economy, Banco de España, March 2018.
1.1  Financial markets 
The favourable tempo
on international financial 
markets continued until 
February...
…when it was interrupted 
temporarily by a sharp rise
in volatility on the US stock 
market which fed through
to European bourses
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of the political tensions in Catalonia, the performance of the Spanish stock market was 
similar from end-October, once the strains in that autonomous community eased.
The bout of stock market volatility in February curbed the pattern of rising yields on higher-
rated bonds in government debt markets. That said, the increases built up since the start of 
2018 were striking, especially in the United States (57 bp to nearly 3%). These developments 
were underpinned by higher inflation expectations and a faster pace of policy interest rate 
rises discounted by the markets for 2018 – which already coincide with the inflation 
expectations of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) – as well as by the approval 
of the expansionary fiscal programme of the new US government which is analysed below. 
In the United Kingdom and Germany yields on long-term bonds increased more moderately 
(by 20 bp in the case of the German bund to 0.63%). As a result of the rise in higher-rated 
government debt yields and the change in monetary policy stance, the yield curve slopes 
behaved differently. For instance, whereas in the United States the slope has flattened 
since this economy is already at an advanced stage of monetary normalisation, in the euro 
area it has steepened and gradually approached historical averages.
These developments occurred in tandem with a slight decline in the risk premia of the main 
European sovereign bonds (Chart 1.1.F) which seems to be linked to the improvement 
perceived in issuers’ credit quality – also reflected in the upgrading of credit ratings. In 
particular, the credit rating upgrades for the Spanish sovereign bonds were as follows: in 
January by Fitch to A-; in March by S&P also to A-; and in April by DRBS to A and by 
Moody’s to Baa1. Thus, the yield spread between Spanish and German ten-year sovereign 
bonds narrowed to 69 bp (42 bp lower than its levels at end-October), having even reached 
66 bp in January, which represents its lowest level since April 2010. The average credit risk 
premia of private issuers experienced a slight rise on both sides of the Atlantic, which was 
more pronounced in the case of euro area financial institutions, although they subsequently 
reversed to a large extent and thus remain at historically low levels (Chart 1.1.H).
Increased volatility in developed countries’ stock markets had a limited effect on emerging 
economies’ markets which were supported by the weak dollar, higher commodity prices, 
robust growth of activity and the gradual reduction of their external vulnerabilities, among 
other factors. Despite heightened volatility, carry trade transactions retained their appeal 
which drove the appreciation of currencies and the squeezing of sovereign spreads. 
Favourable financial conditions were also reflected in primary markets where a new monthly 
high was reached in issuance in January, thanks to sovereign placements, and the high pace 
of placements continued in February and March without significant changes in their conditions. 
By contrast, capital flows into emerging economies in February fell sharply, especially equity 
inflows (Chart 1.1.G), although it is early to anticipate a possible change of trend.
In short, despite the recent rise in volatilities, credit risk premia, especially those of higher-
risk fixed income securities, and the implied term premia on highly rated long-term 
government bond yields remain at historically low levels, according to available estimates. 
Behind these developments are investors’ search for returns in a setting of globally low 
interest rates. Some international stock market indices, particularly those in the United 
States, are at very high levels compared with corporate profits, although estimated stock 
market risk premia do not seem historically low (see Box 1.1). 
The episode of correction on international stock markets in February shows how, despite 
the prevailing low level of volatility in the markets, in the current setting assets prices are 
highly sensitive to changes in agents’ expectations about inflation and the future conduct 
Returns on long-term fixed 
income securities increased 
gradually in a setting of an 
improving global economic 
outlook and the yield spreads 
on the main European 
sovereign bonds narrowed
Increased volatility 
in February had a limited 
impact on emerging 
economies’ markets
Risks of sharp changes
in financial asset prices 
associated with changes
in investor expectations 
persist
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BOX 1.1STOCK-MARKET VALUATION METRICS
It is extremely difficult to gauge the extent to which the price of an 
asset is misaligned with the value justified by its economic 
fundamentals. The indicators traditionally used for this purpose 
usually compare share prices or share indices with fundamentals 
such as corporate profits or dividends. Two examples of this type of 
valuation metric are the price-earnings ratio (PER) and the dividend 
yield or dividend-price ratio. Given that these two metrics tend to 
revert to their historical averages, a share or index is considered to 
show signs of overvaluation if its PER is significantly above, or its 
dividend yield is significantly below, the historical average.
One of the problems with these two metrics as valuation indicators 
is that current profit and dividend information is used to calculate 
them, such that changes are influenced by cyclical patterns in 
these variables. This is a particularly important limitation in the 
case of the PER, as profits fluctuate more widely over the course 
of the economic cycle than do dividends. For this reason, Campbell 
and Shiller1 proposed CAPE (the cyclically-adjusted price-earnings 
ratio) which smooths out standard PER using the last ten years’ 
average inflation-adjusted earnings in the denominator, on the 
assumption that economic cycles last from around six to seven 
years. A priori, CAPE therefore offers a less distorted view of 
whether an index is overvalued, as it uses information covering 
expansionary phases and downturns rather than current data, as 
is the case of the other two metrics mentioned. This is consistent 
with the idea that investors do not value shares solely on the basis 
of companies’ current earnings, but that they take into account the 
entire stream of expected future profits. Specifically, during 
troughs in the economic cycle, earnings will tend to be lower than 
their forecast long-term average, such that non-cyclically-adjusted 
1  See Campbell, J. Y., and Shiller, R. J. (1998): “Valuation Ratios and the 
Long-Run Stock Market Outlook”, Journal of Portfolio Management, 24, 
11–26.
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of central banks. Accordingly, an upward revision in the expected pace of policy interest 
rate hikes in the United States or a change in expectations about central bank balance 
sheet reductions – a seemingly improbable scenario at present in view of their 
communication policies – could unleash an increase in term and credit premia globally, 
which would prompt falls in the price of financial assets, both of bonds and indirectly of 
equities through the positive effect it would have on the discount factor. 
The prices of higher-risk bonds and equities could also show abrupt adjustments faced 
with disruptions which impact significantly global economic growth expectations since the 
latter could affect the probability of debt default and expected future corporate earnings. 
Increasingly discernible in the leading indicators, among the possible triggers, are the 
BOX 1.1STOCK-MARKET VALUATION METRICS (Cont’d.)
PER would be relatively high, giving rise to erroneous overvaluation 
signals. However, CAPE also suffers from certain shortcomings, as 
like PER and dividend yield, it does not take interest rates into 
account, even though they have a direct influence on share prices 
as they form part of the discount factor investors use to calculate 
the net present value of future dividends.
In the same vein, another valuation metric that does take interest 
rates into account is the implied equity risk premium in share 
prices. Specifically, the risk premium is defined as the excess 
expected return from the equity market over the bond market. One 
disadvantage of the risk premium compared to the other metrics 
mentioned is that it is not directly observable and there is no single 
method for calculating it. In this Box, this indicator is proxied by 
subtracting the ten-year inflation-linked bond yield in a given 
economic area from the expected real return on the index for that 
area, estimated using a dividend discount model.2 On this 
indicator, a share or index would be showing signs of being 
overvalued if the implied risk premium is significantly below its 
historical average, as it could indicate that the return demanded 
by investors does not sufficiently compensate the risk incurred.
Charts A, B and C in this Box summarise the performance of the 
valuation metrics discussed above calculated for three share 
indices: S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50 and Ibex 35. On these measures, 
European and Spanish stock markets would not show clear signs 
of being overvalued. Nevertheless, Chart A shows levels of CAPE 
for the United States index to currently be high and a long way from 
the historical average, which suggests the US market is possibly 
overvalued. These signs of overvaluation are not apparent, 
however, in the case of dividend yield (see Chart B) or the risk 
premium (see Chart C), as the present value in each case is close 
to the mean of their distribution. In any event, the results referring 
to the risk premium need to be taken with particular caution given 
that, as mentioned, this indicator is not observable and various 
assumptions have been made, which, while reasonable, are subject 
to a certain margin of error.
Chart D shows the estimated equity risk premium of the S&P 500, 
the yield spread on US high-yield bonds and the yield of ten-year 
US sovereign bonds. First of all, comparing the two risk premia 
shows how they were at similar levels before the crisis. During the 
crisis they picked up, in line with investors’ higher risk perception 
and their more prudent attitude to risk, but the increase was more 
marked in the case of corporate bonds. In the most recent period, 
the risk premium on corporate bonds has dropped significantly, 
coming close to pre-crisis levels, while the equity premium is 
clearly above the levels observed in the pre-crisis period.3 This 
evidence would suggest that investors’ yield-seeking strategies in 
a low-interest-rate environment may have affected the equity 
market to a lesser extent than the fixed income market.
In short, the evidence presented in this Box illustrates the difficulty 
of extracting clear and unambiguous signals of the potential 
overvaluation of equities and the need to interpret indicators with 
caution and combine different indicators, as each of them has its 
limitations. Moreover, the results presented suggest that the signs 
of overvaluation are less evident in the case of European stock 
markets than US ones. In any event, as is mentioned in the body 
of the report, even if equity risk premia do not look particularly low 
at the moment, this does not mean that share prices are not liable 
to be affected by changes in agents’ expectations about interest 
rates or future corporate earnings.
2  The dividend discount model used assumes that dividend growth will be 
equal to investors’ estimate of profit growth over the first few years of 
the time span, assuming that dividends are a fixed fraction of profits. 
Subsequently, dividend growth gradually converges on the economy’s 
long-term growth expectations. The corporate earnings growth forecasts 
were obtained from investors’ forecasts supplied by I/B/E/S (Institutional 
Broker’s Estimate System), while long-term economic growth forecasts 
come from Consensus Economics. For more details, see Box 2.2 of the 
Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, May 2016.
3  Other recent papers, such as Duarte and Rosa (2015), also find the 
current level of the equity risk premium to be high relative to its historical 
average. For more details, see Duarte, Fernando M., and Carlo Rosa. 
(2015): “The Equity Risk Premium: A Review of Models”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York Staff Report 714.
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adverse effects of the incipient escalation of tariffs which could be highly significant if a 
global trade war ensues. Some geopolitical risks could also materialise, although the 
negotiations on the United Kingdom leaving the European Union are making progress and 
a transition period has been agreed which will significantly facilitate the process.
These price adjustment scenarios could be expected to affect to a greater extent those 
segments in which prices have been boosted to a larger degree on account of the setting 
of low returns, as in the case of certain companies with poor credit ratings in the United 
States or some emerging economies, where business debt has increased significantly, 
especially external debt denominated in foreign currencies. 
A possible robust rise in government and private bond yields could have more harmful 
effects on global financial stability than in the past, given the longer average term of fixed-
income securities (which increase price sensitivity to interest rate changes) and the high 
stock of debt in bondholders’ portfolios (in particular, investment funds, pension funds, 
insurance companies and, to a lesser degree, banks). 
A possible sharp adjustment in the prices of fixed-income securities or equities could 
result in a tightening of the financing conditions of different economic agents as well as 
their loss of confidence which, together with wealth effects could have negative impacts 
on their spending decisions and, consequently, on the growth outlook, raising credit risk 
through this channel.
Global economic activity strengthened in the second-half of 2017 and the first few months 
of 2018, supported by the recovery in the advanced economies, with an upturn in investment 
spurring on world trade, in conjunction with sustained growth in China, India and Eastern 
Europe, and a recovery from recession in other emerging economies such as Brazil, 
Argentina and Russia. The forecasts for 2018 have been revised upwards to reflect the 
increased buoyancy and, in the case of the United States, the impact of the expansionary 
fiscal measures adopted in recent months (Chart 1.2). Inflation rates remained moderate, 
particularly core rates, and monetary policies continued to proceed towards normalisation, 
although at different speeds. Thus, the US Federal Reserve raised its policy interest rate by 
a further 25 bp in March to the 1.50-1.75% range, and the Bank of England raised its rate 
by the same amount in November, to 0.5%, while the Bank of Japan kept its expansionary 
measures in place. Financial conditions remained favourable, despite the sharp rise in 
volatility in February. Although the short-term risks for the global economy are tilted to the 
upside, the downside risks include those deriving from the change in the US economic 
policy slant, where the procyclical expansionary fiscal policy may contribute to more 
restrictive monetary policy, with potential negative repercussions for other economies and 
the financial markets, and the implementation of protectionist measures by the United 
States government, which may undermine economic activity and world trade.
Fiscal policy has taken an expansionary stance in the United States in recent months, with 
the adoption of a tax reform in late December and an agreement in February to raise public 
expenditure in 2018 and 2019, at a time when the output gap is already positive (see Chart 
1.3.A). In the short-term these measures will have a positive impact on economic activity, as, 
according to available estimates, they could raise GDP levels in the United States by 1-1.5 
pp over the next two years, with positive spillovers for other areas along trade channels (see 
Chart 1.3.B). However, the final impact will depend on the monetary policy response and the 
reaction of financial markets. Thus, the fiscal stimulus may be expected to push inflation to 
above the current predictions (see Chart 1.3.C), which would lead to a stronger upturn in 
1.2  Macroeconomic 
environment
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THE EURO AREA
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policy interest rates than currently forecast by the US Federal Reserve and the financial 
markets. This greater tightening could coincide with a correction to term premia on long-
term interest rates, an appreciation of the dollar and more restrictive global financial 
conditions, which would reduce the positive impact on economic activity in the United 
States and elsewhere. Moreover, fiscal expansion in the United States will worsen the US 
economy’s fiscal and external imbalances (see Chart 1.3.D), which would reinforce the 
dollar’s downward trend seen since early 2017, hampering the conduct of monetary policy 
in some economies (such as the euro area or China). Lastly, possible limitations on trade 
flows resulting from protectionist measures in the United States (in January tariffs were 
imposed on imports of solar panels and washing machines, in March on steel and aluminium, 
with tariff increases announced for a range of Chinese imports, to which China has 
responded) are starting to make themselves felt in the earliest leading indicators, and may 
harm the medium-to-long-term global growth outlook if they develop into a global trade war.
Economic activity in Mexico in the second half of 2017 differed considerably in each of the 
quarters. In the third quarter the economy contracted as a result of the earthquakes in 
September and the drop in petroleum production, whereas in the fourth quarter the 
economy grew, supported by private consumption and exports. The drop in inflation in 
2018 was the result of end of the base effect caused by the withdrawal of certain energy 
subsidies in January 2017. The central bank raised its policy rate twice in response to 
unanticipated shocks in the second half of 2017. The upside inflation risks include, in 
particular, a depreciation of the peso in response to unfavourable progress of the NAFTA 
... that may adversely affect 
some emerging economies...
SOURCES: Datastream and Consensus.
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negotiations prompted by adverse market movements due to US monetary policy or to 
uncertainty surrounding the presidential election in July.
Brazil remains on a gradual path to recovery from its deepest-ever recession. Nevertheless, 
investment rose in the second half of the year following a drop of 30% during the recession. 
By contrast, net exports and private consumption performed worse than expected, despite 
the sharp drop in inflation, which favoured a recovery in household disposable income. 
Falling inflation allowed the central bank to cut the policy rate further. As regards fiscal 
consolation, the government suspended the process of pension reform and it looks 
unlikely to pass before the forthcoming presidential election in October 2018. Indeed, in 
recent months two rating agencies have downgraded the sovereign rating of Brazil’s 
external government debt.
China’s growth in 2017 was 6.9% on the back of a larger contribution from next exports. 
Inflation remained moderate and the central bank raised policy interest rates. The recent 
rise in the renminbi led to the elimination of the “countercyclical factor” used to set the 
reference exchange rate. At several congresses the Chinese authorities have stressed 
the need to put the quality of economic growth ahead of its speed. New regulations have 
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also been adopted to reduce regulatory gaps, lessen the risks from “shadow banking” 
and create incentives for prudent debt management. 
Economic developments in Turkey were very positive, thanks to the fiscal stimulus and 
credit measures introduced by the government at the end of 2016, improving sentiment 
and the favourable external environment. Nevertheless, the Turkish economy still has a 
number of significant imbalances and vulnerabilities, such as the size of the external deficit 
and high inflation rate, which exceeds 10%, and which heterodox monetary policy (using 
increases in the interest rate on last-resort loans) has been unable to reduce.
In a context of large issues of debt securities denominated in foreign currency by emerging 
countries, currently at an all-time high as a result of low interest rates and the depreciation 
of the dollar, it is worth considering the possible impact of changes in the dollar exchange 
rate on emerging market economies.
Policy interest rate rises in the United States that exceed those discounted by the markets 
could cause upward pressure on the dollar and a depreciation in emerging market economy 
currencies, which would represent a risk for agents that have borrowed in foreign currency 
(primarily in dollars). Nevertheless, a portion of income is in foreign currency and currency 
hedges may be in place, such that the unhedged positions may be less of a concern. Finally, 
it is essential to consider the reserves these economies’ hold to deal with this type of shock, 
with their low levels relative to GDP in Turkey, and particularly in Argentina, standing out. 
By contrast, the projected increase in the government deficit and current account deficit in 
the United States over the next few years has contributed to the recent depreciation of the 
dollar. If this weakening continues, as well as creating an incentive for emerging market 
economies to borrow in dollars, which could heighten the future risks when the trend reverses, 
the most exposed emerging market economy would be China. Specifically, a rising renminbi 
would lead to lower inflation, a worsening trade balance and slower growth. This would make 
it necessary for China to take on more debt to achieve its growth targets and encourage 
capital flows into the country from the exterior. The country’s authorities would face serious 
difficulties conducting their economic policies, as they could not simultaneously keep the 
capital account open, pursue an independent monetary policy and keep the exchange rate 
linked to the dollar. China’s economic policy responses could include interventions in foreign 
exchange markets, leading to an increase in international reserves, reduced controls on 
capital outflows and/or relaxation of monetary policy, which would run counter to the objective 
of reducing the economy’s level of indebtedness. In this context, a potential trade war with 
the United States would worsen the difficulties, given China’s dependence on exports.
Growth continued generally throughout the euro area and the rise of 2.5% in GDP in 
2017 was above the September forecasts (see Chart 1.4.A). This favourable pattern was 
fuelled by the accommodative monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the accompanying favourable financing conditions, by the improvements in the labour 
market and, increasingly, by stronger external trade. In line with this behaviour, in March 
the ECB revised upward its growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 to 2.4% and 1.9%, 
respectively, while the first forecast for 2020 is 1.7%. The latest information points to a 
slowdown in the growth rate of economic activity in the opening months of the year 
influenced by temporary phenomena. However, it is still too soon to rule out the effect of 
other factors such as the past exchange rate appreciation or the stock market corrections 
which, along with the rise in interest rates, have prompted a certain tightening of the 
financial conditions index.
... depending, among other 
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Despite the more favourable performance of economic activity, a low inflation scenario 
persists against a background of wage moderation. On ECB estimates, the year-on-year 
HICP rates, after rising slightly from March, will stand at around 1.5% for the rest of the 
year. Excluding the less stable components (energy and unprocessed food), it seems the 
rate will stand at around 1.3% in the coming months. The changes in the external 
assumptions were reflected in a downward revision of 0.1 pp in the ECB’s inflation 
forecasts for 2019 and 2020 to 1.4% and 1.7%, respectively. The inflation expectations 
embedded in assets traded on the markets have scarcely undergone changes, remaining 
on a path of slow convergence with the reference of 2%.
At its meeting on 8 March 2018, the ECB Governing Council announced that it will continue 
to pursue its expansionary monetary policy stance, holding unchanged its official interest 
rates for a lengthy period which will amply exceed the time horizon of its net purchases of 
assets. These asset purchases are expected to continue at a level of €30 billion per month 
until the end of September 2018. Also, the principal of the securities purchased under this 
programme will be reinvested upon maturity for such time as is considered necessary, with 
a view to ensuring that the liquidity conditions and monetary policy stance continue to be 
appropriate.
The favourable economic developments and the good medium- and long-term prospects 
have reduced some of the risks to financial stability. However, there continue to exist 
risks which may endanger this outlook, particularly those relating to factors of a global 
nature, such as an upsurge in protectionist behaviour or a sharp rise in risk premia at 
international level, which could reawaken doubts over economic growth and consequently 
over the sustainability of the liabilities of certain sectors and agents which still have high 
levels of debt.
In the last few months the Spanish economy has remained on the expansionary path 
initiated four years ago, posting growth rates above those of the major euro area economies. 
On the available estimates, in the first quarter of 2018 GDP increased by 0.7% (3% year-
on-year), equal to the rise posted in the fourth quarter of last year. The Banco de España’s 
latest projections, released in March 2018, are for the expansionary pattern to continue in 
the coming years, albeit at a somewhat slower pace, with year-on-year rates for 2018 and 
2019 exceeding by 0.2 pp and 0.1 pp those estimated in September, standing at 2.7% and 
2.3%, respectively, while the projection for 2020 is 2.1% (see Chart 1.4.B). The upward 
…with inflation rates 
continuing to stand below
the ECB target 
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revisions are based on the correction of imbalances in the economy, the ongoing firmness 
of world activity and trade, the propitious financing conditions with a more expansionary 
fiscal policy stance, and on the decline in the level of uncertainty since December.
The year-on-year rate of change of the Spanish CPI fell from 1.8% in September 2017 to 
1.3% in March 2018 (latest figure available), mainly as a result of energy price falls. The 
behaviour envisaged in the coming months will continue to be strongly marked by the energy 
component and it is expected that, from May 2018, the inflation rates of both the CPI and 
the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy will start to trace an upward path, albeit 
with levels slightly below those estimated in the December projections.
In the opening months of 2018 the available labour market indicators have reflected 
similar employment dynamism to that of the previous quarter, with a quarter-on-quarter 
growth rate of 0.8% according to social security registrations, which allowed the pace of 
registered unemployment decline to hold at 1.9% in the first quarter. According to the 
Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA), the unemployment rate was at 16.5% in December 
2017. In addition, the acceleration in new hires was strongest in permanent contracts, so 
their weight in the total increased by nearly 1 pp to 10.9% compared with the same 
period of the previous year.
The ongoing economic improvement and the favourable financing conditions continued to 
drive demand in the housing market, and the number of house purchases continued to 
grow at above double-digit rates in the second half of 2017. The supply of new homes in 
the past 12-month period ending in December 2017 stood at 81,000, nearly 10% higher 
than the figure of last July, although still well below pre-crisis levels. Prices rose by 7.2% 
in the fourth quarter of the year compared with the same period of the previous year, above 
the 5.6% recorded six months earlier, and the resulting average level was still 26% below 
the highs of 2007, but 19% above the lows of 2014 (see Chart 1.5.A).
This favourable macroeconomic environment helped to further improve the financial 
position of Spanish households and non-financial corporations, as well as the profitability 
of the latter. Against a background of continuing accommodative financing conditions, 
new lending to households and non-financial corporations continued to grow apace, 
which helped to moderate the contraction of the outstanding balance of loans to those 
sectors. This development, along with the ongoing increase in their income against a 
background of growing economic activity (see Charts 1.5.C and 1.5.D), prompted further 
falls in debt ratios and, to a lesser extent, in the financial burden of households and non-
financial corporations. The net wealth of households continue to recover, driven largely by 
house price rises (see Chart 1.5.B). In addition, according to information from the Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey, 2017 brought a slight increase in the returns 
on assets and on equity of the firms in this sample, which edged up to 5.9% and 8.6%, 
respectively, 0.1 pp and 0.4 pp above the 2016 figures.
The general government budget deficit measured as a percentage of GDP (see Chart 1.5.E) 
decreased further to 3.1% in December 2017, thus meeting the deficit target set for that 
year by the EU Council on 8 August 2016 within the framework of the “corrective arm” of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and further reducing the ratio of government debt to GDP to 
98.3%. However that level continues to be very high, so the budgetary consolidation efforts 
will have to continue. This high public sector debt means that the Spanish economy 
continues to have a substantial net debtor position, although the maintenance of current 
and capital account surpluses of around 2% of GDP since mid-2013 has been reflected in 
The behaviour of the inflation 
rate will continue to be highly 
influenced by oil prices 
Unemployment has
continued to fall 
The trend of recovery 
in prices and quantities 
continued in the housing 
market 
Households and non-financial 
corporations continue
to improve their financial 
position…
…and the financial position
of general government and of 
the economy as a whole also 
improved, although their levels 
of debt continue to be high 
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a decrease in the net debtor position to 80.8% of GDP in December 2017 (see Chart 1.5.F). 
The gross external debt measured as a proportion of GDP decreased to 164.8%, its lowest 
level in more than three years.
Since the publication of the previous FSR in November 2017, the situation of the non-
financial sectors of the Spanish economy has continued to improve, favoured by the 
growth of activity and employment. Further progress was also made in the reduction of the 
imbalances built up during the crisis. However, high levels of debt persist in general 
Growth of economic activity 
firmed, although the high 
levels of government...
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government and in the economy as a whole vis-à-vis the rest of the world, which constitute 
factors of fragility and make the Spanish economy vulnerable to negative future behaviour 
of activity and financing conditions.
Against the current background, the main macroeconomic risks for Spain continue to lie in 
the international environment. The risks include particularly those arising from a possible 
resurgence of protectionist policies perhaps triggering a trade war, from geopolitical 
tensions or from sharp corrections in world financial market prices which may trigger a 
tightening of financing conditions with potentially negative effects on countries with high 
levels of debt such as Spain. Finally, although the tensions over the political situation in 
Catalonia have declined since December, a possible increase in uncertainty with the 
related impact on capital market financing conditions and on the Spanish economy as a 
whole cannot be ruled out.
... and external debt are
sources of vulnerability 
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2 BANKING RISKS, PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
International exposure
In 2017 the consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions decreased by 1.7% year-
on-year to €3,539 billion (see Annex 1). This decline in total assets resulted from the fall 
in activity in Spain, where financial assets dropped by 3.8% year-on-year in 2017. 
Contrastingly, the volume of financial assets abroad rose slightly (1%) with respect to the 
previous year (see Chart 2.1).
The presence of Spanish banks abroad is concentrated mainly in Europe (57%, notably in the 
United Kingdom, which accounts for 29.2% of loans abroad), Latin America (25.9%, 
particularly Brazil and Mexico with 8.6% and 8% of loans abroad, respectively) and the United 
States, with around 14.3% of loans abroad. Chart 2.2.A shows the geographical distribution 
of loans between 2014 and 2017. The increase in the percentage of loans to Europe (excluding 
the United Kingdom), up from 19.8% in December 2014 to 27.6% in December 2017, is 
notable. Also significant is the lower percentage of loans in Latin America, down by 6.8 pp to 
25.9% in December 2017 (compared with 32.7% in December 2014).
Activity in the geographical areas with a higher presence of Spanish banks abroad consists 
mainly of lending to households and non-financial corporations. Notable in the United 
Kingdom is the predominance of household lending (which accounts for 67% of total loans), 
while in the rest of Europe, Latin America and the United States lending to households and 
non-financial corporations is more even. Moreover, in the United Kingdom household 
lending is mainly for the purpose of house purchase, unlike in the rest of Europe, Latin 
America and the United States where consumer credit is more important than mortgage 
lending (see Chart 2.2.B).
Chart 2.3 shows the rate of change of loans in the main countries in which Spanish deposit 
institutions engage in activity abroad, along with the behaviour of the exchange rate of 
their respective currencies. In 2017 the euro appreciated generally against the other 
2.1 Banking risks
2.1.1  CREDIT RISK
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currencies, particularly against the Turkish lira (22.6%), the Brazilian real (15.8%) and the 
US dollar (13.8%), and to a lesser extent against the pound sterling (3.6%). By contrast, the 
euro depreciated against the Polish zloty (–5.3%). Thus the appreciation of the euro against 
these currencies helps to explain the decrease in the volume of loans in Brazil (–12.1%) and 
the United States (–9.8%). In Turkey the volume of loans only fell by 5% despite the 
aforementioned sharp depreciation of the Turkish lira against the euro. The volume of loans 
in Chile decreased by 27.6% despite the fact that the euro only appreciated by 7.2% 
against the Chilean peso, although in this case the sharp decrease in the volume of loans 
was because of the sale by a Spanish bank of its subsidiary in Chile. Contrariwise, there was 
a sharp increase in the volume of loans in Portugal, which practically doubled with respect 
to the previous year, mainly due to the integration of a Portuguese bank into a Spanish one. 
In the United Kingdom the volume of loans grew by 4.6% despite the depreciation of the 
pound sterling.
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Despite the differing behaviours in 2017 of Spanish deposit institutions’ exposures in the 
various countries in which they are present, as noted above the aggregate international 
exposure increased slightly throughout the year (1%), albeit against a background of 
appreciation of the euro against the main currencies.
Finally, it should be noted that the activity of Spanish deposit institutions abroad is 
conducted through financially autonomous subsidiaries. In this respect, activities abroad 
are conducted mainly in the local currency of the country in question, with some exceptions 
(specifically, in December 2017, the percentage of business denominated in Turkish lira 
represented 50% of the financial assets in Turkey).
Total non-performing assets
The volume of consolidated total non-performing assets of Spanish deposit institutions 
decreased significantly in 2017 by 21% year-on-year to stand at €116.1 billion (see Annex 1), 
this rate being higher than in 2016 when it hovered around 10%. Consequently, the ratio 
of banks’ non-performing assets to their consolidated total assets decreased from 4.1% 
in December 2016 to 3.3% a year later.
Consolidated total non-
performing assets of Spanish 
deposit institutions decreased 
significantly in 2017, with a 
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C  EU NPL RATIOS
December 2016 and September 2017
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
GR (a) PT IT IE ES EU
average
AT FR NL DE GB
SEPTEMBER 2017DECEMBER 2016
%
CHART 2.4INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE. NPL RATIO
Deposit institutions. Consolidated data
40,6
0
2
4
6
8
10
GB US Europe
(without GB)
PT PL TR DE FR Latin
America
BR MX Other
countries
DECEMBER 2016 DECEMBER 2017
%
A  NPL RATIO ABROAD
December 2016 and December 2017
B  EU NPL VOLUMES
December 2016 and September 2017
0 100 200 300
IT
FR
ES
GR
GB
DE
NL
PT
IE
AT
DECEMBER 2016 SEPTEMBER 2017
€bn
46.7
SOURCES: Banco de España and European Central Bank.
a NPL ratio in Greece is 46.7% (46.3% in December 2016).
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The total non-performing assets ratio (including credit and debt securities) decreased to 
3.8% in December 2017, down 99 bp with respect to the previous year (4.8%). The non-
performing loans (NPL) ratio behaved similarly, decreasing from 5.6% in December 2016 
to 4.4% in December 2017.
In the case of business abroad, Chart 2.4.A generally shows a positive performance of the total 
NPL ratio in the main countries where Spanish deposit institutions have a presence. In the 
United Kingdom and the US, which account for more than 40% of loans abroad, and in Germany 
and France, the NPL ratio continued to hold below 2%. In Latin America, the ratio decreased 
slightly in Brazil and Mexico. By contrast, the NPL ratio increased in Turkey from 2.6% in 
December 2016 to 3.8% a year later. In Portugal and Poland the NPL ratio fell considerably, 
most notably in Portugal where it decreased by 2 pp to 6.1% in December 2017.
The data published quarterly by the European Central Bank in its consolidated database 
allow the behaviour of the NPL volume and of the NPL ratio to be compared at European 
level. Chart 2.4.B shows the decrease in the volume of NPLs between December 2016 and 
September 2017 at the deposit institutions of the main European countries. Most notable 
among the countries analysed was Italy, which, despite having reduced substantially its 
volume of NPLs in the first three quarters of 2017, continued to head the ranking with €239 
billion of NPLs (23.7% of the total NPLs of the EU countries as a whole). For its part, Spain is, 
after France, the European country with the third highest volume of NPLs (12% of the total). 
Chart 2.4.C shows that, despite the continuing high dispersion between countries (with ratios 
between 1.6% and 46.7% in the United Kingdom and Greece, respectively), there was a 
general decrease in the NPL ratio except in Greece (where it increased by 0.4 pp). Against this 
background of generally decreasing NPLs, Chart 2.4.C sets out the NPL ratio at European 
level, which in September 2017 stood at 4.4% (against 5.2% a year earlier), slightly lower than 
that of Spanish banks (4.7%, down from 5.7% in December 2016).
Domestic exposure
The data drawn from individual financial statements allow the behaviour of risk exposure 
in Spain to be analysed. Credit to the resident private sector decreased by €23.2 billion in 
2017, a year-on-year decline of 1.9% (see Chart 2.5). The decrease is appreciably lower 
than that in 2016 (€51.4 billion), and the year-on-year rate of fall is the lowest since the 
start of the economic recovery. Thus, despite the fact that outstanding credit continues to 
decline, the trend observed seems to show that the process of deleveraging is coming 
to an end in credit extension in Spain. 
The less negative performance of rates of change of credit was apparent both in non-
financial corporations and in households. In the case of firms, the year-on-year decrease 
was 3.1% in December 2017, compared with a year-on-year decrease of 3.5% twelve 
months earlier. Lending to households fell by 1.3% with respect to the previous year, which 
was also lower than in December 2016 (–2%). 
In lending to households, the behaviour of loans for house purchase differed greatly from 
that of other loans. While loans for house purchase decreased by 2.6% in December 2017 
in year-on-year terms, which was a slightly lower fall than a year earlier, household lending 
for purposes other than house purchase grew by 5.6%, basically due to consumer credit, 
thereby continuing the positive rates of change seen since the beginning of 2016. For a 
more detailed analysis of loans to households for purposes other than house purchase, 
see Box 2.1.
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Sectoral analysis shows that loans to the construction and real estate sector decreased 
by 10% in December 2017 with respect to the figure a year earlier, the rate of change 
recovering slightly from that of –10.4% in 2016. Other credit to non-financial corporations 
barely underwent significant changes in the past year (decrease of 0.1%, similar to that 
a year earlier). 
Analysis by firm size shows that credit to SMEs decreased by 2.1% year-on-year in 
December 2017, which was a more moderate decline than in 2016 (4.3%).1 Meanwhile, 
lending to large firms moved in the opposite direction, decreasing by nearly 5% year-on-
year compared with the more moderate decrease of 3.1% a year earlier. Part of this 
decrease can be explained by large firms’ higher recourse to the market, linked also to 
developments in the Eurosystem monetary policy. A more detailed analysis of the behaviour 
of credit to SMEs can be found in Box 2.2.
The rate of change of credit to the resident private sector in 2017 improved across-the-
board (see Chart 2.6.A), although the variability with respect to December 2016 increased. 
The variability of consumer credit behaviour across banks decreased (see Chart 2.6.B) and 
the distribution shifted to the right of the chart, evidencing a higher and more across-the-
board growth of credit. 
Chart 2.7.A shows the behaviour, over a long time period, of new mortgage loans for 
house purchase. This chart plots the volume of new credit (annual flow) and the volume 
of total mortgage credit (stock at December each year), both with base 100 in the first 
year for which information is available (2002), and the flow of mortgage credit as a 
percentage of the stock. The volume of new mortgage loans has progressively recovered 
in recent years, 2017 included. The percentage of the credit stock represented by new 
credit increased from a low of 2.8% in 2013 to 6.2% in December 2017. In addition 
to the performance of new credit, Box 2.3 analyses the time behaviour of the loan-to-
value ratio.
1  It should be taken into account that in 2017 a firm cancelled a significant amount of loans to its associates, so 
these figures and those of Box 2.2 are affected by this event.
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BOX 2.1CONSUMER CREDIT: ANALYSIS OF RECENT PERFORMANCE
As indicated in Section 2.1.1, credit extended by Spanish deposit 
institutions to the resident private sector continued to decline in 
2017, in step with the pattern observed in recent years. Since 2016, 
however, the segment of lending to households for purposes other 
than house purchase has grown, in contrast to the contractionary 
performance of other modes of credit. In this setting, this Box 
analyses in depth the performance and the NPL rates and coverage 
levels of the different kinds of consumer credit, and how Spanish 
banks compare with their European peers in this respect.
Loans to households for purposes other than house purchase 
(which include consumer credit, both for purchase of consumer 
durables and goods and services and for other purposes) 
amounted to more than €102 billion at December 2017, which is 
16.7% of loans to households and 8.6% of total credit to the 
resident private sector.1 As Chart A shows, this credit segment has 
grown uninterruptedly since 2016 Q1, with rising year-on-year 
rates of change that reached 5.6% in December 2017. Loans to 
households for purposes other than house purchase may be 
1  The figures in this Box include, from July 2017, the business of a former 
specialised lending institution that became part of a deposit institution at 
that date. 
2  Credit for other purposes includes credit for the purchase of land, 
garages or parking spaces and storerooms not linked to house purchases, 
purchase of securities, debt consolidation and other credit.
broken down into two components: consumer credit, which at 
end-2017 accounted for 57% of the total (€58 billion); and credit 
for other purposes2 which made up the remaining 43%. The 
growth in loans to households for purposes other than house 
purchase stems from the sharp increase in consumer credit, which 
recorded year-on-year rates of change over 15% throughout 2017. 
By contrast, credit for other purposes has tended to shrink in 
recent years, with rates of decline between 10% and 5% in 2017.
In this segment, NPL rates have been changeable in recent years: 
they fell by between 10% and 20% year-on-year up to September 
2016; they then rose, also significantly, up to September 2017, 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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BOX 2.1CONSUMER CREDIT: ANALYSIS OF RECENT PERFORMANCE (cont’d)
and then moderated to 1.1% in 2017 Q4. Moreover, in this case there 
is a more uniform pattern between the two components of loans to 
households for purposes other than house purchase (see Chart B).
As a result of this performance, NPL ratios of loans to households 
for purposes other than house purchase fell by almost 3 pp 
between December 2014 and December 2017, down to 9.6% 
(see Chart C). Again this pattern is mainly attributable to consumer 
credit, owing to the decline in its NPL ratio from 7.7% in December 
2014 to 5.2% in December 2017. Although in the early years of the 
period this decline stemmed from the decrease in non-performing 
loans, in more recent quarters it was the result of the significant 
expansion of consumer credit. In turn, the NPL ratio of credit for 
other purposes fell in 2015 and has risen since then, up to 15.4% 
at end-2017.
The rate of coverage of non-performing loans was relatively steady 
throughout the period analysed (see Chart D), going from 40.1% in 
2014 to 40% at end-2017 in terms of aggregate loans for purposes 
other than house purchase. The rate of coverage of consumer credit 
is notably higher – over 50% throughout the period analysed – 
compared with the coverage of credit for all other purposes 
(34.4% at end-2017).
Chart E permits a more detailed analysis of the performance of 
consumer credit through its two components: credit for purchase 
of consumer durables, which accounted for 53% of the total 
(€31 billion) at December 2017; and credit for purchase of other 
goods and services (47%). As the chart shows, these modes of 
credit have behaved quite differently since 2016. Thus, while credit 
for purchase of consumer durables (which includes private cars) 
has shown strong and increasing year-on-year rates of growth, 
reaching 26.8% in December 2017, credit for purchase of other 
goods has grown at a more moderate pace (5.3% at end-2017).
The NPL ratio for loans for purchase of consumer durables has 
decreased significantly and continuously (see Chart F), from 6.4% 
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
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The approval rate of the loans requested by non-financial corporations from the banks 
with which they are not currently working increased slightly in 2017 Q4 with respect to the 
previous quarter to stand at values around 33%. This slightly tempered the downward 
trend seen in previous quarters and restored the initial values of the time series at the 
start of 2017 (see Chart 2.7.B). This approval rate remains, however, far removed from 
those seen in the years before the crisis, when they were around 47%, albeit above the 
lowest level (25 %) of the historical time series which occurred between 2008 and 2013. 
This rise in acceptance rates took place at the same time as the number of loan 
applications increased by 2.1% in the last half of 2017 compared with the same period a 
year earlier.
The interest rates on new loans (see Chart 2.7.C) continued on the path of recent years. In 
the case of firms, they continued their slight decline, particularly in loans below €1 million. 
In households, the course was more steady both in loans for house purchase and other 
(basically consumer) lending, as occurred also in 2016.
Notable in this setting of very low interest rates was the shift of banks’ credit exposure to 
more profitable business segments such as consumer credit. It must be pointed out that 
this segment is also one of those with historically high NPLs.
Meanwhile, at end-2017, according to data from individual financial statements, which 
consider only the activity of banks operating in Spain, forborne loans to the private sector 
decreased by 23.6% year-on-year to €88.7 billion.2
2  At consolidated level, the volume of forborne loans to the private sector decreased to €123 billion, down 19.9% 
from December 2016.
The loan approval rate rose 
in the fourth quarter, although 
it is still far from the values 
seen in the pre-crisis years
Interest rates on new loans 
continued on the path seen 
in the previous year in lending 
to both firms and households
BOX 2.1CONSUMER CREDIT: ANALYSIS OF RECENT PERFORMANCE (cont’d)
in December 2014 to 3.3% in December 2017. By contrast, 
despite falling sharply in 2015, the NPL ratio for loans for purchase 
of other goods and services has risen slightly since then, standing 
at 7.3% at end-2017.
Chart G depicts new loans to households for purposes other than 
house purchase in recent years. The pattern is the same 
as for credit stock: credit growth is attributable to the higher growth 
in new consumer credit, while new credit for other purposes was 
more erratic, growing in 2015 and then declining in following years.
To conclude, Chart H compares the performance of consumer 
credit in Spain with that observed in other European countries. The 
chart, which draws on ECB data,3 shows that since mid-2015 
consumer credit growth rates in Spain have outstripped the euro 
area average. Moreover, since mid-2016, Spain posts the highest 
growth rates of the main euro area economies, with rates of change 
in excess of 10%, compared with growth of between 5% and 10% in 
the other economies. However, on a broader time frame, the chart 
also shows that during the economic crisis, consumer credit 
performance was considerably less buoyant in Spain, contracting 
by between 8% and 12% in the period 2011-12, compared with an 
average decline of 2% in the euro area as a whole.
Accordingly, the performance observed in Spain in recent years 
may be explained, at least in part, by the lower starting levels that 
are only now beginning to recover. Specifically, this performance 
would appear to show that, given the improvement in both 
economic activity and the employment rate, consumer decisions 
that had been put on hold and postponed as a consequence of the 
crisis are now being taken.
In any event, consumer credit is the business segment with the 
highest interest rates (see Chart 2.7.C), and in view of the low interest 
rate environment in which banks operate, they could be seeking 
opportunities to obtain higher returns at the cost of assuming higher 
risks. In consequence, how consumer credit and its NPL rates 
perform should be monitored closely in coming quarters.
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CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
Business in Spain, ID. Deposit institutions
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BOX 2.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LENDING TO SMEs1
As discussed in the main text of the FSR, growth in lending to non-
financial corporations remained negative in 2017. Nevertheless, the 
two components of business lending, namely large firms and SMEs,2 
performed somewhat differently last year. Lending to large 
corporations dropped by almost 5%, representing an acceleration in 
the rate of decline from that observed in 2016 (-3.1%),3 whereas 
lending to SMEs registered a rate of decline of 2.1%, having recovered 
by over 2 pp from the previous year’s rate of change (dropping 4.3% 
in 2016, see Chart A). As a consequence of these different paths, 
lending to SMEs increased as a share of total lending to non-financial 
corporations, reaching almost 51% in December 2017.
A slight recomposition of lending to SMEs has taken place in 
recent years, with a decrease in the share of lending to medium-
sized enterprises and an increase in the share of lending to 
microenterprises (see Chart B). Thus, in December 2017, lending 
to microenterprises accounted for over 36% of lending to SMEs 
after having grown by 0.2% in 2017; lending to medium-sized 
enterprises represented 33%, after dropping by 6.2%, and the 
remaining 31% was accounted for by small enterprises, with a 
decrease of 0.2% last year.
1  See note 1 in chapter 2 of the FSR.
2  A company is classed as an SME if it matches the definition given in 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 (DOCE L 124 
of 20/5/03). On this definition, an SME is a company with fewer than 250 
employees and an annual turnover of up to €50 million or whose balance 
sheet total does not exceed €43 million. Additionally, within the SME 
category, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise that employs 
fewer than 50 people and has an annual turnover or balance sheet total 
of up to €10 million. Also within the SME category, a microenterprise is 
defined as an enterprise that employs fewer than 10 people and has an 
annual turnover or balance sheet total of up to €2 million.
3  Part of this decrease may be due to the greater recourse to the market by 
large corporations, which is also linked to developments in Eurosystem 
monetary policy.
In recent years there has also been a change in the distribution of 
lending to SMEs in terms of the sector of activity financed. As Chart C 
shows, whereas in March 2014 over 45% of lending to SMEs went 
to the construction and real estate development sector, in 
December 2017 less than a third did.
The NPL ratio for SMEs remains higher than that for large 
corporations, but both have dropped significantly in recent years. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Troubled assets in Spain 
As regards the explicit manifestation of credit risk, in 2017 NPLs continued the decrease 
seen in the last few years, largely due to the positive performance of the Spanish 
economy in the past year. This decrease, at €18.2 billion in absolute terms in the 
past year, was slightly higher than that in 2016 (€17.6 billion). As a result, NPLs at 
December 2017 were 16.2% lower than at December 2016 in business in Spain. Since 
their peak in December 2013, NPLs have now decreased by €95.1 billion and their 
current amount is 50.3% lower than at December 2013 and below the levels seen in 
2010 (see Chart 2.8.A). 
By institutional sector, NPLs decreased in lending to both non-financial corporations 
and households, albeit very differently. Whereas in non-financial corporations the 
decrease was very significant (–20.7% year-on-year at December 2017) and higher than 
NPLs in business in Spain 
decreased somewhat more 
than in the previous year, at a 
year-on-year rate of 16.2%, 
with a cumulative decline of 
50.3% since December 2013
The past year saw a decrease 
in the NPLs of households...
BOX 2.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LENDING TO SMEs (cont’d)
Specifically, since 2014 the NPL ratio for SMEs as a whole has 
decreased from 30.7% to 16.8%, a drop of 13.9 pp. In the case of 
large corporations, it has gone from 12.3% to 6.8%. Within lending 
to SMEs, credit quality can also be seen to improve with the size of 
the SME. Thus, in December 2017 the NPL ratio on lending to 
microenterprises was close to 22%, in the case of small enterprises 
it was 14.7%, and in that of medium-sized enterprises it was 13.2% 
(see Chart D). As already noted, these NPL ratios have been 
declining in recent years in all size brackets.
New lending to non-financial corporations rose steadily over the 
course of 2017,4 and within it new lending to SMEs remained 
relatively stable, with slight growth in the second half of the year 
(see Chart E). Over the course of 2017 new lending to SMEs 
reached €113 billion (compared to €109 billion in new lending 
to large corporations), distributed as follows: almost €44 billion to 
medium-sized enterprises, a very similar amount (€43 billion) 
to small enterprises and the remaining €25 billion to microenterprises 
(see Chart F).
As in the case of consumer credit, although at significantly lower 
rates, Spanish banks are increasing their relative share of lending 
to SMEs, a segment which has higher interest rates than lending to 
large corporations (see Chart 2.7.C), although subject to higher 
credit risk, which partly manifests itself in a higher NPL rate.
4  New lending is defined as loans arranged in new business for the banking 
system, excluding roll-overs, refinancings or subrogations. It also 
excludes increases in drawn-down principal under revolving credit, trade 
credit, other loans with limits, credit cards and overdrafts on loans 
arranged in previous months.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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BOX 2.3DEVELOPMENTS IN CREDIT STANDARDS BASED ON THE LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIO
The behaviour of the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), which is the ratio of 
loan principal to the value of the associated collateral, is one of the 
indicators most commonly used to monitor mortgage lending 
standards. The Banco de España analyses this and other indicators 
as part of its monitoring of the risks in the Spanish mortgage 
market, in line with the Recommendation of the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) on relevant information on the real-estate sector 
for macroprudential purposes issued in 2016.1 
This Box describes trends in the LTV ratio for residential mortgages 
granted to natural persons and the prices of the property used as 
collateral or guarantee for these loans. The analysis takes the 
house price index published by the National Statistics Institute 
(INE) as its reference. Data on mortgage loans and housing 
appraisal values have been drawn from two different sources: the 
Association of Registrars,2 whose database provides granular data 
on all new mortgages entered on property registers, enabling the 
LTV ratio to be calculated at the time of loan origination; and 
the accounting information regularly sent by financial institutions 
to the Banco de España. The latter source was used to calculate the 
LTV of the system’s total mortgage lending (this information covers 
not just new loans, but the total outstanding mortgage balance).
Chart A shows how average LTVs changed between 2004 and 
2017. Based on the available information, two series can be 
distinguished: (i) new mortgage loans; and (ii) the whole mortgage 
loan portfolio.3 The chart also includes the year-on-year change in 
house prices.
The data show a positive correlation (of 77%) between the 
average LTVs of new loans and the change in house prices, 
i.e. average LTVs move in the same direction as house prices. 
1  Recommendation ESRB/2016/14 of 31 October 2016 on closing real 
estate data gaps. The Recommendation aims to contribute to the 
availability and comparability of data on residential and commercial real 
estate in the EU.
2  The Association of Registrars’ database contains information on real-
estate transactions and mortgage originations registered monthly by 
Spanish real-estate registries since 2004. It includes both residential and 
commercial properties together with the property appraisal value and 
mortgage loan principal. It contains relevant information on transaction 
values, physical characteristics of properties, and the conditions 
established in the mortgages registered.
3  For new loans, the system’s average LTV is an average weighted by the 
value of each loan. For the LTV of the outstanding balance of mortgages, 
as information is at the level of credit sub-portfolios by LTV segment 
rather than loan by loan, it is assumed that the midpoint of each 
segment represents the LTV of the corresponding sub-portfolio, 
aggregating the information for all the segments to obtain the LTV for all 
mortgages as a whole.
This characteristic may reflect a degree of procyclicallity of LTVs, in 
that during expansionary periods the expectation that the value of 
property used as collateral will rise increases the willingness to 
grant larger loans relative to the appraisal value, while in 
contractionary periods credit standards become stricter.
The main exception to this pattern was how these variables 
behaved in the period from 2010 to 2013, when average LTVs on 
new lending remained stable at around 67%, whereas house 
prices underwent a severe correction (with successive year-on-
year drops of over 5%). This pattern could reflect changes in the 
structure of credit demand, whereby more credit-worthy 
individuals or households accounted for a larger share. This 
would make the appraisal value of the property less decisive 
when granting new lending (in that if new loans are safer, it is less 
SOURCES: Banco de España, Association of Registrars and INE.
a For the total mortgage portfolio, only residential mortgages to individuals are included, based on the information that institutions periodically submit to Banco 
de España. New mortgages include all housing mortgages to individuals with houses as collateral according to the information provided by the Association of 
Spanish Property and Commercial Registrars.
b Mortgages to individuals secured with residential property as collateral.
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that a year earlier (–17.3%), in households this decrease was much more moderate 
(year-on-year decline of 2.8% at December 2017) and slightly lower than that a year 
earlier (–3%). 
Analysis by activity (see Chart 2.8.B) shows that NPLs decreased considerably in the 
construction and real estate sector (–30.6% year-on-year at December 2017, compared 
with a decrease of 16.2% in 2016) and more moderately in the other non-financial sectors 
taken as a whole (–9% at December 2017 compared with –18.6% at December 2016). In 
lending to households, non-performing house purchase loans decreased by 4.4% year-
on-year at December 2017, somewhat less than the decline recorded a year earlier (–5%). 
Regarding NPLs to households for other purposes, basically but not only consumer credit, 
these increased by 1.1% with respect to the volume a year earlier, so their rate of change 
decreased with respect to that of 2016 (2.4%), which is notable considering that this was 
the sector with the highest growth in the past year. 
...and, to a larger extent, 
of non-financial corporations
In non-financial corporations, 
the decrease was much more 
significant for the construction 
and real estate sector, 
while in households they 
decreased in house purchase 
loans, albeit less so than 
in the previous year, 
and increased by 1.1% 
in household lending other 
than for house purchases
BOX 2.3DEVELOPMENTS IN CREDIT STANDARDS BASED ON THE LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIO (cont’d)
likely that the mortgage collateral will be foreclosed), which could 
explain the disconnection observed between average LTVs and 
house prices in the period mentioned. It could also reflect more 
cautious policies by lenders, in a context of high and rising levels of 
default, as well as heightened economic and financial uncertainty.
Since 2014, average LTVs of new loans have risen to levels 
exceeding those observed in the period 2004-2006. However, over 
the period 2016-2017 a slight slowdown or even contraction of 
average LTVs to around 73% was observed. Underlying this pattern 
were changes in the composition of the new-lending portfolio, as 
discussed below.
Finally, average LTVs across the whole mortgage loan portfolio 
(amounts outstanding) are significantly lower than the average 
LTVs of new loans. This is because lenders take the outstanding 
amount as the numerator when determining the value of average 
LTVs across the whole mortgage loan portfolio in each period. 
Moreover, no relationship is apparent between the average LTVs 
of the total portfolio and house prices. The LTV level of the total 
loan portfolio may react to a wide range of factors that are not 
necessarily related to the value of the mortgage’s collateral, 
which is why the correlation between these two series is close to 
zero. For example, in periods when the flow of new loans is 
sluggish, average LTVs tend to decrease, as the improvement in 
LTVs resulting from the repayment of existing loans becomes 
more significant. Meanwhile, increases in LTV may be caused by 
the rising significance of the flow of new credit or the impact of 
possible remortgages where the appraisal value of the property 
is updated with a lower value (leading to a higher LTV), something 
which could happen in the context of falling house prices. 
In short, LTVs for new lending seem to be a more representative 
measure of the credit standards lenders are applying at any 
given time.
To analyse changes in LTVs for new loans they have been grouped 
into four categories (the distribution is shown in Chart B): (i) loans 
with LTVs of less than 40%; (ii) loans with LTVs between 40% and 
60%; (iii) loans with LTVs between 60% and 80%; and (iv) loans 
with LTVs of over 80%. The way in which the segments have varied 
over time allows three different periods to be distinguished. Over 
the period 2004-2007, the relative weight of each of the segments 
remained fairly constant. Loans with low LTVs (i.e. less than 60%) 
represented around 30% of all new loans, whereas loans with LTVs 
of over 80% accounted for slightly more than 20% of new loans.
A tightening of credit conditions over the period 2008-2013 is 
discernible, translating into a change in the composition of the 
portfolio of new mortgages. Specifically, the segment with low 
LTVs rose strongly to account for almost 40% of total new mortgage 
lending when the crisis was at its peak. Meanwhile, the opposite 
trend can be seen in the high-LTV segment, with a drop in relative 
significance (the share of these loans dropping to around 15%).
Finally, since 2014 the segment with LTVs between 60% and 80% 
can be seen to have increased its share relative to the top and 
bottom segments: (i) LTVs of less than 60% fell gradually; (ii) LTVs 
over 80% remained stable and even declined somewhat at the end 
of the period. In this context, the increase in average LTVs shown 
in Chart A does not necessary mean lenders are incurring more 
risk, but could be due to the consolidation of the mortgage segment 
with LTVs between 60% and 80%, which currently accounts for 
slightly more than half of new lending, to the detriment of mortgages 
with very high or very low LTVs. 
This assessment is consistent with changes in residential mortgages, 
where the stock continues to decrease and the flow of new credit, 
although growing, remains at relative levels far from those reached in 
the previous expansionary phase (see Chart 2.7.A)
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The decrease in NPLs occurred across-the-board (see Chart 2.8.C). Thus, compared 
with the distribution in 2016, it is seen that in the December 2017 distribution banks are 
more concentrated in negative rates of change of NPLs. However, this contrasts with the 
behaviour of the segment of loans to households other than for house purchase. In this 
respect, Chart 2.8.D plots the distribution of the change in non-performing consumer 
NPLs. RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
Business in Spain, ID. Deposit institutions
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loans for deposit institutions. It shows that the bulk of banks moved to less negative or 
near-zero rates of change in the past year, and that many recorded positive rates. The 
persistently low profitability faced by banks may have induced them to seek higher profits 
recently at the cost of running higher risks. More details of the behaviour of NPLs to 
households for purposes other than house purchase may be found in Box 2.1. 
Chart 2.9 shows the behaviour of NPLs to the resident private sector from December 2013 
to December 2017, explaining the changes in each period in terms of inflows into NPLs, 
outflows from NPLs to write-offs and recoveries of NPLs. In terms of amount, the past year 
saw a smaller quantity of credit classified as non-performing than in the previous year, less 
outflow to write-offs and more recoveries of NPLs.
If the economy maintains the pattern of growth seen in recent years with an evident recovery in 
employment and activity, and banks continue their active management of the stock of NPLs, an 
additional decrease in the NPLs of deposit institutions’ business in Spain will be possible. 
The NPL ratio of the resident private sector in business in Spain continued the trend shown 
in recent years and decreased further to 7.9% in December 2017 (see Chart 2.10.A), 
driven by the downward movement of NPLs throughout the year and the more moderate 
fall in credit seen in that period. This NPL ratio is 1.3 pp lower than that in December 
2016, the fall in the ratio having accelerated in comparison with that in 2016, which was 
1 pp. The cumulative decrease from the highest value of the time series (December 2013) 
is 6.1 pp. The NPL ratio remained at 7.9% in February 2018 (latest data available), and 
after adjusting for provisions (as at December 2017) it stood at 4.3%.
By institutional sector (see Chart 2.10.B), the NPL ratio decreased both in non-financial 
corporations and, more moderately, in households. In the former, it decreased from 14.9% 
in December 2016 to 12.2% in December 2017, and in the latter, from 5.4% to 5.3%.
In households, the NPL ratio held steady in the past year in house purchase loans 
(4.5%), while in loans for other purposes there was a moderate decrease from 10% in 
December 2016 to 9.6% in December 2017. The NPL ratio of lending to non-financial 
corporations decreased both in the construction and real estate sector (from 26.5% in 
December 2016 to 20.4% a year later) and in the other sectors of activity (to 8.9% in 
Compared with 
the previous year, in terms of 
amount inflows 
into NPLs and transfers to 
write-offs decreased while 
recoveries of NPLs increased
The continued growth 
of the economy and active 
management will allow NPLs 
to continue to be reduced
The NPL ratio 
decreased further to 7.9% 
in December 2017
The ratio decreased 
in non-financial corporations 
and, more moderately, 
in households
In households the NPL ratio 
of lending for house purchase 
held steady and that of lending 
for other purposes decreased, 
while in corporate...
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that become performing again, foreclosed assets and NPLs sold to third parties.
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December 2017 compared with 9.8% a year earlier). This improvement was due to the 
growth of credit (denominator of the ratio) and to the smaller rise in NPLs (numerator).
By firm size, the NPL ratio decreased both for SMEs and, more especially, for large firms. In the 
former, the decrease was by 3.2 pp to 16.8%, while in the latter the decrease was by 2.6 pp to 
the 6.8% seen in December 2017. Box 2.2 describes the behaviour of the NPL ratio by firm size.
The gross book value of foreclosed assets at December 2017 was slightly above €58 
billion, which represented a fall of 25.7% with respect to December 2016. In addition to the 
net outflow of foreclosed assets which took place in 2017, the main reasons behind the 
considerable change seen were, firstly, the adjustment of the gross book value of Banco 
Popular Español’s foreclosed assets to their value net of provisions at the date of resolution 
of this bank and, secondly, reporting adjustments. 
Generally in 2017, the systemic risk indicator (SRI), which measures synthetically the level 
of stress in the financial markets, remained low. In October 2017, the SRI increased, 
reflecting certain tensions in the financial markets as a result of the political uncertainty in 
Catalonia, but in November it decreased to the subdued levels of the rest of the year 
(see Chart 2.11.A). In the first week of February 2018 it also rose slightly due to the sharp 
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price adjustments and to the higher US stock market volatility and its spread by contagion 
to the Spanish markets noted in Chapter 1 (see Charts 1.1.A and 1.1.E). However, the 
impact was limited in time and the SRI has now returned to low levels.
The contribution of Spanish banks to the systemic risk of the euro area as a whole is 
quantified by means of a model known as conditional value at risk (CoVaR).3 Following 
episodes of systemic alert recorded during the crisis, the average CoVaR of Spanish banks 
has since remained at much lower levels. The last few years have seen less negative values 
in the 5th percentile of the CoVaR of euro area banks, indicating a fall in the contribution to 
systemic risk from the banks identified as most systemically important. This improvement 
is also seen in the average for Spanish banks. However, at the same time the average 
CoVaR of Spanish banks has moved nearer to the bound delimited by the 5th percentile of 
the euro area as a whole. This indicates that the contribution to systemic risk from Spanish 
banks has increased in relative terms with respect to the rest of the European system, 
although in absolute terms its contribution has decreased. Since the previous FSR there 
have been two rises relating to the recent upsurges in market volatility in November 2017 
and February 2018. These bouts seem to have affected mainly euro area banks.
3 For an explanation of the CoVaR model, see the May 2015 FSR.
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR .
b? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
comprises a total of 33 listed Spanish and euro area institutions.
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In the past six months, the euro area interbank money markets have continued to show 
very low activity, particularly in the unsecured segment. Chart 2.12.A shows the EONIA 
trading volume, which since mid-2016 has held at historically low levels with a slightly 
downward trend. Similarly, the Spanish interbank market continues to post very low 
volumes of activity.
The low interbank market trading is largely explained by the conditions of excess liquidity 
in which the euro area banking system is operating, which in turn is caused by the conduct 
of monetary policy. The volume of liquidity provided by the Eurosystem, €3,251 billion at 
mid-April, came from asset purchase programmes (€2,490 billion) and from refinancing 
operations (€761 billion). The evolution of these forms of Eurosystem liquidity provision is 
shown in Chart 2.12.C.
As the purchase programme has progressed, the relative importance of loans has 
progressively decreased. Of the latter, the bulk of funding, €739 billion, relates to a 
series of four targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO-II). These TLTRO-II 
operations provided funds to banks with a four-year maturity at an interest rate which 
will depend, for each bank, on the behaviour of the volume of its portfolio of loans to 
firms and households, excluding those for house purchase, between February 2016 
and 31 January 2018. The interest rate applicable may be as low as the deposit facility 
rate (–0.4%) while the maximum rate is that of main refinancing operations (0%). This 
incentive, designed to stimulate the extension of bank credit to the real economy, may 
be a factor contributing to the behaviour of credit to households and firms described in 
Boxes 2.1 and 2.2.
The Eurosystem continues to conduct regular one-week and three-month lending 
operations which, as announced by the ECB in October 2017, will continue to be executed 
at a fixed rate with full allocation at least until the end of the last reserve maintenance 
period of 2019. Banks are thus assured of an ample period of time during which they will 
receive all the liquidity they request.
The funding obtained by Spanish banks in lending operations amounted to €169 billion in 
mid-April, practically all provided in targeted longer-term refinancing operations, representing 
22% of the total liquidity received by all Eurosystem banks (see Chart 2.12.B).
With regard to longer-term funding, Spanish banks increased, in aggregate terms, their 
issuance activity in 2017 relative to the previous year and, in general, their activity was 
higher in the first half of the year. As regards the instruments issued, senior debt issuances 
increased notably and mortgage covered bonds decreased by a similar volume 
(see Chart 2.12.D). The senior debt issued in 2017 includes the senior non-preferred debt 
which began to be issued in the second quarter of 2017 and will be used by Spanish and 
European banks to meet the MREL (minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities) 
set at European level to facilitate the resolution of banks as and when needed. The issuance 
of debt eligible as additional Tier 1 capital and of subordinated debt eligible as Tier 2 capital 
increased appreciably in 2017, and the amount of each type of subordinated debt issued in 
2017 exceeded €6 billion.
Regarding the yield which banks must offer for this type of funding on the markets, Chart 
2.12.E shows that the cost of senior debt and covered bonds issues clearly differs from 
that of subordinated debt issues. Moreover, the cost of debt eligible as Tier 1 capital is 
appreciably higher than that of subordinated debt eligible as Tier 2 capital. Finally, it can 
2.1.3 FUNDING RISK
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be seen that the average yield offered by Spanish bank issues is in line with that provided 
by euro area banks, although the dispersion in the rates required at European level is 
appreciably higher, probably because of the widely varying business, size and financial 
position of the issuing banks.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic and Banco de España.
a Senior debt, covered bonds, subordinated debt Tier 2 and additional Tier 1 issues. Retained issues are not included.
b In the graph are shown the maximum cost, the minimum cost, the 75th-25th percentile range and the weighted average (weighted by the issuance amount) of the 
issuance cost (proxied by the coupon of the corresponding instrument) issued by Spanish banks and by euro area banks in 2017.
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As regards funding, private sector deposits on the consolidated balance sheet of 
Spanish deposit institutions decreased by 0.4% year-on-year to €1,959 billion in 
December 2017 (see Annex 1). Chart 2.13 shows that the decrease in the volume of 
total deposits of the private sector (which in addition to households also includes 
financial and non-financial corporations) was due to the behaviour in Spain, where they 
fell by 3.2% year-on-year with respect to the same month a year earlier, while deposits 
abroad increased by 3.7%.
Chart 2.14.A shows the geographical distribution of deposits between 2014 and 2017. 
Generally speaking, there were no structural changes in the distribution of deposits from 
the various geographical areas in which Spanish deposit institutions are present, although 
the percentage of deposits in Latin America decreased significantly by 6 pp to 25.9% 
(in line with the decrease in the volume of loans mentioned above). Also notable was 
the increase in deposits in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe from 25.1% and 
24.8% in December 2014 to 28.1% and 28.3% in December 2017, respectively.
In 2017 the total deposits 
of the private sector 
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Particularly important in the United Kingdom is the funding received from households, in 
line with the credit provided to this segment which, as noted above, is predominant in the 
United Kingdom. Funding from households also predominates, albeit to a lesser extent, 
in the United States and the rest of Europe. In Latin America the proportions of funding 
from households and from non-financial corporations are more even (see Chart 2.14.B). 
The data published monthly by the ECB in its database of individual balance sheets 
allows comparison of the behaviour of the structure of funding of monetary financial 
institutions (MFIs) from the various euro area countries. Chart 2.15 shows the structure of 
MFIs funding in December 2017. Notable in the case of Spanish banks is the funding from 
euro area customer deposits, which at end 2017 represented 52.3% of the total, one of 
the highest proportions in the countries considered. The equity of Spanish banks (10.8%) 
and deposits from central banks (6.5%) also play a more significant role than in most of 
the countries analysed. 
Generally speaking in all the countries analysed the structure of MFIs funding was relatively 
similar, although with some notable exceptions. As in Spain, the main source of funding in 
most countries is euro area customer deposits, except in Ireland and Luxembourg where 
deposits from non-euro area customers (included in other liabilities) are highly significant. 
In Spain the main source 
of funding of MFIs is customer 
deposits, although equity 
and deposits from central 
banks are also notable 
for their significance relative 
to other European countries
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In France and, to a lesser extent, in Germany, deposits from other domestic MFIs are fairly 
significant. In the Netherlands, debt issuance is a significant source of funding for banks, 
while in Spain, Italy and Portugal deposits from euro area central banks play a more 
significant role than in other euro area countries. In short, the focus of business on the 
retail, wholesale or capital market and, to a lesser extent, the financial crisis explain 
the difference in funding strategies among the banking union countries.
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) measures the ability of banks to cope with possible 
liquidity stress for a period lasting 30 days. Chart 2.16 shows that in December 2017 the 
LCR of the analysed European banks as a whole stood at 148.5%, well above the threshold 
of 100% required from 2018. Analysis by country also reveals ratios significantly above the 
minimum required in all the countries analysed; Spanish banks as a whole, with a ratio of 
151.1%, stand slightly above the European average. In short, this analysis shows that 
banks have high-quality liquid assets available to meet the net outflows of cash which may 
occur in a liquidity stress scenario.
Retail deposits taken by Spanish deposit institutions from households and non-financial 
corporations, analysed using the data from the individual financial statements of business 
The liquidity coverage ratio 
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in Spain, increased by 2.8% in December 2017 compared with the same month a year 
earlier (see Chart 2.17.A). This rate is similar to that in December 2016 and, in general, to 
those seen since mid-2015, when the deposits of households and non-financial 
corporations began to recover despite a downward trend in interest rates. Owing to their 
low yield, time deposits continued to be replaced by sight deposits (see Chart 2.17.B), the 
former having decreased by 24% year-on-year in 2017 and the latter having increased by 
15% in the same period. 
The downward trend in lending, albeit progressively more subdued, and the recovery of 
resident private-sector deposits in the last few years has allowed a significant ongoing 
decrease in the loan-deposit ratio in recent years, which also continued to be seen in 
2017. This ratio is practically half of its value in October 2007, when the peak of the whole 
series was recorded (see Chart 2.17.C). 
In 2017, against a background of low returns on assets, the net assets of investment funds 
continued their upward trend initiated at the end of 2012, so the volume of investment funds 
in Spain has now been increasing for five years. In particular, in 2017 the net assets 
of investment funds increased by more than €27 billion (nearly 12%) to €263 billion, 
...deposits rising 
and time deposits falling
The loan-deposit ratio again 
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and this growth has continued in the first two months of 2018. The growth was due mainly 
to a sustained rise in net subscriptions (see Chart 2.17.D). The yields on investment funds 
also contributed positively to the increase in their amount in aggregate terms, although in 
four months of 2017 their contribution was negative, as it was in February 2018.
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has continued to make progress in its definition of 
shadow banking and in the methodology for quantifying its size. Specifically shadow 
banking refers to those activities which entail the generation of risks similar to banking 
risks (transformation of liquidity and of maturities, leverage, etc.) but which are not 
subject to banking regulation or supervision and lack access to central bank liquidity. 
By means of the definition of certain economic functions, the FSB determines which 
non-bank financial intermediaries engage in credit intermediation not subject to banking 
regulation and are thus considered to be shadow banking. According to this common 
FSB analysis methodology, shadow banking in Spain accounts for 6% of the total 
assets of Spanish financial institutions.4
Chart 2.18.A shows the distribution by country of the financial assets held by the various 
financial institutions, and the weight of shadow banking. At ov erall level, Spain contributes 
less than 0.7% to the total financial assets considered as shadow banking. These figures 
put Spain within the group of advanced countries with a low weight of shadow banking 
(see Chart 2.18.B). The measure obtained using the economic functions considered is 
composed mainly of assets held by certain collective investment vehicles (see Chart 2.18.C) 
whose growth has determined the increase in shadow banking in recent years. The relative 
size of the sector suggests that the sources of alternative financing for the Spanish 
economy would have a low effect on the credit market in the short term, although it is 
advisable to monitor their behaviour and their possible risks.
In 2017, Spanish deposit-taking institutions as a whole posted consolidated earnings 
attributed to their parent institutions of €15,572 million (see Annex 2), 44 % higher than in 
2016. However, if Banco Popular Español’s loss of over €12 billion as a result of its 
resolution on 7 June 20175 is considered, the final figure comes to €2,722 million, a drop 
of almost 75% from earnings in 2016. In order to avoid the resolution of Banco Popular 
Español’s distorting the analysis of Spanish deposit-taking institutions as a whole, its effect 
has been excluded from the analysis. The same principle has been applied when studying 
the profitability of business in Spain in order to follow uniform criteria in both analyses.
The increase in earnings translated into the return on assets (ROA) of Spanish deposit-
taking institutions as a whole rising by almost 14 bp last year, from 0.30% in 2016 to 
0.43% in 2017. Similarly, return on equity (ROE) also rose, in this case by almost 1.7 pp, 
from 4.3% in 2016 to 6% in 2017.
A breakdown of the contribution of the main income statement components to this 
increase in ROA between December 2016 and December 2017 is shown in Chart 2.19.A. 
The income statement’s components performed favourably compared to the previous 
year, with the exception of gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities and operating 
4  The list of economic functions (EF) identified by the FSB and used for classifying the entities engaging in shadow 
banking is as follows: EF1 includes the management of collective investment vehicles that are susceptible to 
investor runs; EF2 refers to the granting of loans dependent on short-term funding; EF3 relates to market 
intermediation dependent on short-term funding; EF4 comprises the contribution to credit creation; and EF5 
consists of credit intermediation based on asset securitisation and financial institution funding. 
5  For a detailed explanation of Banco Popular Español’s resolution process, see Box 2.4 of the November 2017 FSR.
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expenses. At the top of the income statement, both net interest income and net 
commissions increased relative to 2016, and at the bottom of the income statement, both 
financial asset impairment losses and other items improved their contribution to 
consolidated earnings relative to 2016.
Net interest income grew by 3.7% in 2017 relative to 2016 as a result of the sustained 
decrease in financial costs (–10.6%, see Annex 2), despite financial products declining by 
almost 2%. This increase in net interest income caused it to rise by 10 bp relative to 
average total assets (ATA). Similarly, net commissions grew by 6% over the past year, 
rising by 5 bp relative to ATA. For their part, gains and losses on financial assets and 
liabilities continued their decrease from previous years, with a reduction of 3 bp relative to 
ATA. Operating expenses edged up by 0.9% last year, rising by 3 bp relative to ATA. 
However, as gross income grew more than operating expenses, the Spanish banking 
sector’s overall cost-to-income ratio improved in 2017. Finally, impairment losses on 
financial assets continued their unbroken decline begun in late 2012 (see Chart 2.19.B), 
decreasing 4 bp relative to ATA.
In Europe’s current low-interest-rate environment, Spanish deposit-taking institutions 
have increased both their net interest income, on the back of their foreign business, 
and their net commissions from both their activity in Spain and their foreign business 
outside the euro-area. Chart 2.20 analyses in more detail the items at the top of the income 
statement, which best reflect the pure banking business, and compares them with the rest 
of Europe. In particular, the share of gross income represented by net interest income and 
commissions is examined. It can be seen that, among Spanish institutions, the share of 
gross income represented by net interest income (almost 70%) is higher than in comparable 
European countries and the European average (57%, see Chart 2.20.A). By contrast, the 
percentage of Spanish institutions’ gross income accounted for by net commissions is 
somewhat smaller (less than 25%) than in the main European countries and the European 
average (28%, see Chart 2.20.B).
In terms of the cost of the resources used to generate profits (i.e. efficiency), the Spanish 
banking sector’s efficiency continues to be higher than the European average and that 
Net interest income grew 
by 3.7% in 2017 on 
the previous year, as a result 
of the sustained decrease 
in financial costs. Net 
commissions also grew 
relative to 2016
For Spanish institutions, 
net interest income represents 
a percentage of gross income 
that is larger than 
the European average, 
while commissions account 
for a smaller share
The Spanish banking system’s 
cost-to-income ratio remains...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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of the main European countries. According to European Central Bank data from September 
2017 (the most recent available), while the cost-to-income ratio of Spanish institutions is 
slightly above 50%, the European average and Italian and British banks’ ratios are over 
60%, while German and French banks’ ratios are over 70% (see Chart 2.21.A). The same 
data show that Spanish institutions’ cost-to-income ratio improved between December 
2016 and September 2017, mainly as a result of the increase in gross income, although the 
improvement was smaller than registered for the European sector as a whole, or in 
countries such as Italy and the United Kingdom, which considerably reduced their 
operating expenses (see Chart 2.21.B).
Analysis of institutions’ individual financial statements shows returns on business in 
Spain to be lower in 2017 than those on their consolidated global business, although 
there had been an improvement since 2016. In particular, ROA on business in Spain 
rose from 0.25% in December 2016 to 0.35% in December 2017. The main underlying 
reason for this improvement is the 20% reduction in financial asset impairment losses 
last year.6
By contrast, net interest income from business in Spain fell by almost 7% as a result of 
there being a bigger drop in financial revenue than in financial costs. Chart 2.22.A shows 
how, in the case of business in Spain, financial revenue and costs, as well as net interest 
6  If Banco Popular Español’s provisions in the first half of 2017 are taken into account, financial asset impairment 
losses across the sector as a whole increased by 8.1% relative to the previous year.
...in a better position than 
that of its peers
The reduction in impairment 
losses improved earnings 
from business in Spain 
in 2017...
... despite an almost 7% drop 
in net interest income
SOURCE: European Banking Authority.
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SOURCE: European Central Bank.
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income, have gradually decreased over the last five years. By contrast with the drop in 
net interest income, net commissions from business in Spain rose by more than 5% last year. 
Consistent with the analysis of the items at the top of the income statement in the 
European comparison, Chart 2.22.B shows how the percentage of gross income of 
business in Spain accounted for by net interest income and net commissions has 
changed in recent years. First of all, it can be seen that, accounting for around half of 
gross income, net interest income is less important in domestic business than in 
consolidated global business (where it accounts for almost 70%, as mentioned above). 
This shows the greater importance of net interest income for Spanish institutions 
in their international business as a profit generator. For its part, at around 25%, the 
share of gross income represented by net commissions is very similar in the case 
of both domestic and international business. As regards the development over time, 
Chart 2.22.B shows how over the last five years there has been a decrease in the ratio 
of net interest income to gross income (from 56% in 2012 to 50% in 2017), and an 
increase in the proportion of net commissions (from 19% in 2012 to 25% in 2017).
Following the trend observed in recent years, operating expenses were reduced by more 
than 2% last year, in the context of a capacity adjustment process entailing a reduction in 
the number of employees and offices in Spain (see Chart 2.23.A). The cumulative decrease 
in employee numbers in December 2017 was 32% relative to the peak in June 2008, while 
more than 39% of offices have closed since the peak in December 2008 (see Chart 2.23.B). 
Moreover, the consolidation processes under way in 2017 should help improve the Spanish 
banking system’s medium-term efficiency.
Finally, as discussed in previous FSRs, the challenge for deposit-taking institutions’ 
business that the process of financial innovation through the development of new products, 
services and intermediaries represents cannot be overlooked. The so-called “fintech” 
phenomenon, which stresses the importance of the technological component of this 
process, offers institutions opportunities to expand their range of products and services or 
increase their efficiency (for example, by reducing the cost or time involved in transactions 
or obtaining information). It also increases competition in the financial sector by expanding 
the pool of potential suppliers of the various types of financial products and services, thus 
posing a challenge for traditional banking. In this connection, Box 2.4 takes a closer look 
at the phenomenon of crypto-assets and their potential implications for financial stability, 
consumer protection and market integrity.
The “fintech” phenomenon 
offers institutions 
opportunities and increases 
the competition they face, 
making it a challenge 
for traditional banking
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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BOX 2.4CRYPTO-ASSETS: TYPES, RISKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
Crypto-assets can be defined as a category of private virtual assets 
which are chiefly supported by the combined use of cryptographic 
techniques and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). It is a broad 
concept which differentiates between two large “families”: those 
initiatives which have been conceived for use in payment 
transactions and the so-called digital tokens. The former are 
generally known as “cryptocurrencies” (although they do not in fact 
have the characteristics associated with money), whereas the latter 
are the digital representation of value which are usually issued to 
obtain financing and entitle their owner to receive a return or 
remuneration in kind, or to exercise certain rights.
In the public sphere, a debate has also commenced about the 
creation of virtual money issued directly by central banks 
(see the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) report entitled 
“Central Bank Digital Currencies”, March 2018).
Crypto-assets arose initially to be used as a medium of exchange 
when predominantly digital goods and services are received by 
means of a voluntary agreement between creditors and debtors. 
The DLT underpinning this type of virtual assets permits the 
decentralised sending of payments, i.e. without financial 
intermediaries or the usual clearing and settlement systems used in 
current payment systems. Occasionally the removal of 
intermediaries has fostered the initial use of these instruments as a 
medium of exchange in certain instances, for example, to make 
cross-border payments.
Additionally, since crypto-assets can be traded on certain exchange 
platforms, as time has passed this has prompted greater interest in 
their appeal as an investment vehicle. At the same time, some 
of the characteristics of the markets where they are traded 
(e.g. shallowness, lack of transparency in price formation 
mechanisms and elevated concentration) explain their high 
volatility. Specifically, the volatility of the Bitcoin – perhaps the most 
popular of these products – was 94.28% in 2017, which was 
substantially higher than that of other traditional assets such as oil 
(26.18%) and gold (10.97%).1 
Since the Bitcoin emerged in 2009, the number of the first type of 
crypto-assets has grown to more than 900 initiatives, representing 
capitalisation of around $300 billion.2 However, more than 80% of 
the market is concentrated in five of this type of crypto-assets. The 
lack of data on the breakdown by transaction type makes it difficult 
to ascertain the actual weight of crypto-assets as a medium of 
exchange. In aggregate terms, the number of daily Bitcoin 
transactions in 2016 averaged approximately 264,0003 worldwide, 
compared with 334 million retail transactions in the EU alone. 
Payment transactions made on Ripple, the platform used mainly 
for cross-border payments, represent between 3% and 4% of total 
transactions.4 Therefore, everything seems to indicate that these 
assets have a very limited role as a medium of exchange and their 
popularity stems essentially from their speculative nature as an 
investment asset.
1  Bloomberg and coinmarketcap.com.
2 https://coinmarketcap.com/en/
3 This figure rose to 1,136,210 between January and March 2018.
4 https://xrpcharts.ripple.com/#/metrics
5 However, around 20% of the tokens do not record market capitalisation.
The second category of crypto-assets – digital tokens – is a more 
recent phenomenon which started to become more important in 
2017. Initially, digital tokens began to be employed for the 
programming of smart contracts performed by using DLT. In simple 
terms, these contracts are based on a code or IT protocol which 
facilitates the automated verification and performance of the 
underlying contract, without the need for intermediaries.
One of the most notable subsequent applications of these crypto-
assets are ICOs (initial coin offerings), digital token issuance 
mechanisms for firms and individuals to obtain funds to finance 
investment projects, in exchange for providing their holder with a 
future return (security tokens), the receipt of goods or services 
which are the purpose of the business project or the exercise of a 
series of non-economic rights such as voting rights (utility tokens). 
Tokens are issued when legal tender or other crypto-assets are 
received, and can generally be traded on exchange platforms. 
Currently, these issues are very diverse given the characteristics 
and objectives of the underlying projects.
The market for these digital tokens has grown more rapidly than the 
cryptocurrencies market, reaching in a short time more than 600 
initiatives with a capitalisation of $34 billion5 and a lower 
concentration of holders.
As indicated above, crypto-assets cannot be considered as money 
in economic terms because they do not fulfil its three basic 
functions: a store of value, a unit of account and a medium of 
exchange. They can only be used as a consideration for goods and 
services received in limited specific cases and their highly variable 
prices makes it impossible for them to be used as a store of value 
over time and as a standard numerical unit of value. It should be 
noted that unlike coins and banknotes with legal tender status, 
crypto-assets are not supported by a central bank or public 
authority and cannot be deemed a means of payment since they 
are not a universally accepted asset.
Without detriment to the potential advantages that crypto-assets 
and, in particular, their underlying technology can contribute to the 
financial system, they have a series of risks which are being 
scrutinised by public authorities worldwide. On one hand, high 
market volatility exposes crypto-asset holders to sharp movements 
in their positions, making them highly speculative investments. The 
lack of liquidity in these markets may also hinder the conversion of 
crypto-assets into legal tender at a specific point in time. 
Additionally, their high reliance on fledgling technologies does not 
exclude the possibility of operating failures and cyber threats which 
could mean they are temporarily unavailable or, in extreme cases, 
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In short, in 2017, despite the persistence of pressure on the profitability of the Spanish and 
European banking sector, rising profits translated into positive stock-market performance 
for both Spanish institutions and those of the other main European countries. Thus, the 
Spanish banking sector as a whole registered a share-price increase of over 10%, in line 
with the European average (see Chart 2.24.A). So far in 2018, the rising share prices of the 
first few weeks came to a halt with contagion from the sharp drop on Wall Street in the first 
week of February, such that in the year as a whole, the final result was slightly downward. 
As a result, European banks’ price-to-book values have broadly risen since the start of 
2017, and on this metric the Spanish banking sector has maintained its strong position 
relative to its European peers, although below the threshold of one (see Chart 2.24.B). 
Spanish and European banks 
performed positively on stock 
markets in 2017
BOX 2.4CRYPTO-ASSETS: TYPES, RISKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (cont’d)
the entire investment is lost. On the other, as a result of the 
anonymity which is characteristic of transactions involving crypto-
assets, their use is particularly attractive for unlawful and illegal 
activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing.
In view of the existing risks and the current developments in these 
markets, the authorities are analysing the possible implications of 
private crypto-assets for the financial system. Organisations such 
as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the BIS and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) are making 
considerable efforts in this area. At present, the impact of crypto-
assets on global financial stability is considered limited in view of 
their scope and scale,6 admittedly, given the growth momentum 
of these products, ongoing monitoring of this phenomenon is 
recommendable. Nevertheless, there are other risks which should 
also be considered; specifically, the priority courses of action are 
focusing on the protection of financial services users and market 
integrity. Thus, the warnings and statements aimed at alerting 
investors and financial services users of the risks arising from the use 
of crypto-assets and the related financial products are worth noting.7 
Regulatory measures on the prevention of money laundering and 
terrorist financing are also being adopted by extending the 
requirements of the current arrangements to other players such 
as, for example, the exchange platforms and digital portfolio 
providers.8
6  See section one of the letter of the Chairman of the FSB to the G20 of 13 
March 2018 (http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P180318.pdf).
7  In the case of Spain, for example, see the joint press statement of the 
CNMV and the Banco de España on “cryptocurrencies” and “initial coin 
offerings” (ICOs), of 8 February 2018.
8  The publication of the amendment to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing is pending in the EU.
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Spanish deposit-taking institutions’ highest-quality capital, Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), 
stood at 12.7% in December 2017, having dropped slightly in 2017 (16 bp), partly as a 
result of the resolution of Banco Popular Español. Meanwhile, both the total capital ratio 
and the Tier 1 capital ratio rose during the year. Specifically, the total capital ratio reached 
15.4% in December 2017 (compared with 14.7% in December 2016), while the Tier 1 
capital ratio stood at 13.3% at the end of 2017 (compared with 13% the previous year).
Over a longer time horizon, it can be seen from Chart 2.25 that capital ratios have 
risen over the last three years. The CET1 ratio rose by almost one percentage point from 
11.8% in December 2014 (the first full year of application of the prudential solvency 
standards approved by the Basel Committee, generally referred to as Basel III, which were 
transposed into the European regulatory framework by CRR/CRD-IV). Similarly, the total 
ratio increased by almost 2 pp from 13.6% in December 2014 and the Tier 1 capital ratio 
rose by 1.5 pp (from 11.8% on the same date).7
In absolute terms, the capital level decreased last year for all three types of capital, with the 
drop in CET18 being largest (see Chart 2.26.A). Nevertheless, as risk-weighted assets (RWAs) 
are the denominator of the ratios, a reduction in RWAs translates into the changes in the ratios 
discussed (a slight drop in the CET1 ratio and increases in the other two ratios). In 
late 2017, RWAs accounted for 45% of total assets of those institutions obliged to report 
their own funds. Continuing the trend from recent years, the composition of these RWAs 
remained stable over the course of 2017. Credit and counterparty risk make up the bulk of 
the RWAs (87%), followed by operational risk (9%), while position, exchange rate and 
commodity risk, and other risks, represent less than 5% of institutions’ RWAs 
(see Chart 2.26.B.). An analysis of changes in the credit exposures, RWAs, densities and 
calculation methods of the main European countries based on data from the EBA stress 
testing and transparency exercises is given in Box 2.5. Box 2.6 summarises recent 
decisions by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) taken last December 
regarding completion of the capital framework known as Basel III, which complements the 
initial phase of reforms agreed by supervisory and regulatory authorities in response to 
the financial crisis.
7  The ratios take into account the gradual transitional adjustments designed to facilitate the progressive 
implementation of Basel III. The implementation schedule establishes that, in general, in 2017 80% of deductions 
will be deducted from common equity, while the remaining 20% will be deducted from Additional Tier 1 capital.
8  This reduction is partly due to the resolution of Banco Popular Español, as well as the effect of the reduction in 
transitional adjustments.
2.3 Solvency
The CET1 ratio came to 12.7% 
in December 2017, having 
dropped slightly last year
The increase in the total 
capital and Tier 1 capital 
ratios was underpinned 
by the reduction in risk-
weighted assets
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As regards the structure of own funds, in 2017 there was a slight recomposition deriving 
from the bigger drop in Common Equity Tier 1 than in Additional Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 
capital. Notwithstanding these patterns in 2017, CET1 continued to account for the vast 
majority (82%) of the Spanish banking sector’s own funds (see Chart 2.26.C), while Tier 2 
capital accounted for 14% and Additional Tier 1 capital (which is included in the calculation 
of Tier 1 capital but not in that of CET1) accounted for just 4% of own funds.
Chart 2.26.D gives an itemised breakdown of CET1, the main component of own funds, in 
terms of RWAs. It can be seen that capital instruments comprise more than half 
of the eligible components of CET1. Reserves constitute the second most important 
eligible item (35%), such that capital and reserves make up over 85% of the eligible 
components of CET1. Finally, minority interests (6%) and transitional adjustments (6%) 
complete the eligible components.
Common Equity Tier 1 
constitutes the bulk 
of the sector’s own funds 
and the majority of CET1 
is in the form of capital 
instruments
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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BOX 2.5CREDIT EXPOSURES AND RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS
The published results of the EBA’s latest 2017 transparency 
exercise, with reference dates 31 December 2016 and 30 June 
2017, for a sample of 132 banks across 25 countries of the 
European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA), give 
continuity to the analysis conducted in previous editions of the 
FSR relating to credit exposures and risk-weighted assets (RWAs).
This Box analyses the change, between December 2013 and June 
2017, in the composition of credit risk, the volume of credit 
exposures under the standardised approach (SA) and the internal 
ratings-based approach (IRB), and RWA densities under the IRB 
approach for the main portfolios (corporates, retail and secured by 
real estate).
For this purpose, the data of the Spanish deposit institutions that 
took part in the EBA’s transparency and stress testing exercises 
were analysed, together with those of the banks of five benchmark 
countries. To this effect, a uniform sample of 60 banks was 
considered: Germany (17), Spain (13), France (10), United Kingdom 
(4), Italy (10) and Netherlands (6).
In general, the conclusions drawn are similar to those drawn in 
previous editions of the FSR. In particular, there are still significant 
differences from one country to another in terms of the intensity of 
use of the IRB approach. The differences also persist in RWA 
densities, measured as the ratio of the risk assessment of credit 
exposures to the total value of those exposures, according to the 
approach used (SA or IRB), especially in private sector portfolios 
(corporates, retail and exposures secured by real estate) and in the 
densities resulting from the use of internal methods in the countries 
analysed. These issues are studied in more detail below.
1. Composition of credit risk
Chart A shows how the composition of credit exposure by portfolio 
(public sector and central banks, financial institutions, corporates, 
retail, secured by real estate and other) has evolved for the different 
countries in the sample. By exposure class, portfolios of exposures 
to corporates and of those secured by real estate have remained 
at around 30% and 20%, respectively, while the portfolio of 
exposure to the public sector and central banks has grown 
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BOX 2.5CREDIT EXPOSURES AND RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS (cont’d)
(from 20% in December 2013 to 25% in June 2017) and the 
portfolio of exposures to financial institutions has shrunk (from 
13% in December 2013 to less than 10% in June 2017).
By country, the weight of the portfolio of exposures secured by 
real estate stands out in the Netherlands and Spain (35% and 
30%, respectively), and the weight of the portfolio of exposures to 
corporates stands out in Germany, France, the UK and Italy. In 
addition, the weight of the portfolio of exposures to financial 
institutions is higher in Germany than in the other countries in the 
sample, even though it has declined in the period analysed (9 pp 
between December 2013 and June 2017). The same occurs in 
France, where the weight of the portfolio of retail exposures is 
higher than in the other countries.
2. Volume of credit exposures under the IRB approach
Chart B shows the change between December 2013 and June 
2017 in the volume of credit exposures under the IRB approach as 
a proportion of total exposures. In general, there has been no 
significant change in the intensity of use of the IRB approach in 
the countries in the sample. Spain and Italy have the lowest 
proportion of exposures under the IRB approach (43% and 52%, 
respectively, at June 2017), and the Netherlands and the UK the 
highest proportion (85% and 76%, respectively). The figures for 
France and Germany are close to the average for the countries in 
the sample.
Chart C shows the change in the same period in the intensity of 
use of the IRB approach in the private sector portfolios. In this 
case, the proportion of exposures under the IRB approach is 
higher than for the credit portfolio overall; in addition, between 
December 2013 and June 2017 this proportion increased slightly 
(by between 1 pp and 8 pp) for the countries in the sample. In this 
case also Spain is the country with the lowest proportion of 
exposures under the IRB approach (59%), compared with 
Germany and the Netherlands with figures over 90%.
3. RWA density under the IRB approach
Charts D and E depict the change between December 2013 and 
June 2017 in RWA density under the IRB and SA approaches for 
SOURCE: EBA.
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BOX 2.5CREDIT EXPOSURES AND RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS (cont’d)
each country in the sample, both for the total portfolio (Chart D) 
and the private sector portfolios (Chart E).
For the countries in the sample as a whole, considering the 
portfolio overall, RWA density under the IRB approach is slightly 
lower than RWA density under the SA approach, although the 
difference between the two has narrowed over the period 
analysed. In Germany, however, RWA density under the 
IRB approach is higher than under the SA approach, mainly 
owing to the size of the portfolio of exposures to the public 
sector and central banks and of the portfolio of exposures to 
financial institutions – both of which are low RWA density – as a 
proportion of the total exposures measured using the SA 
approach (see Chart D).
If the analysis is concentrated on the private sector portfolios (see 
Chart E), RWA density under the IRB approach is half that observed 
under the SA approach in the period analysed and for the countries 
in the sample as a whole. By country, the Netherlands has the 
lowest RWA density under the IRB approach, and Italy and Spain 
the highest. Also, as indicated above, the Netherlands is the 
country of the sample with the highest proportion of exposures 
under the IRB approach.
Lastly, Chart F shows RWA density under the IRB approach for the 
different private sector portfolios at June 2017 and December 
2013. In general there has been little change, although there are 
some portfolios in some countries where RWA density under the 
IRB approach has fallen considerably, specifically exposures to 
corporates (in Germany), retail exposures (in the UK and, to a lesser 
extent, in Spain) and exposures secured by real estate (in the UK 
and, to a much lesser extent, in Germany and Spain). In addition, 
there are still major differences from one country to another in RWA 
density under the IRB approach, especially in retail exposures, with 
a difference of 20 pp between Italy (24%) and Spain (44%).
Spain is still the country of the sample with the highest RWA 
density under the IRB approach in portfolios of exposures to 
corporates (57%) and retail exposures (44%). It is also one of the 
countries, together with Italy, with the highest RWA density under 
the IRB approach in the portfolio of exposures secured by real 
estate (17%).
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BOX 2.6COMPLETION OF BASEL III
On 7 December 2017 the Basel Committee’s oversight body, the 
Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision 
(GHOS), endorsed the Basel III reforms outstanding, also known as 
the “post-crisis reforms”. The agreement reached essentially 
completes the cycle of changes to the Basel regulatory framework 
that was set in motion in 2009 in response to the global financial 
crisis (see Table A).
The overall aim of the post-crisis reforms recently agreed is to help 
restore the credibility of the calculation of risk-weighted assets 
(RWAs), which are the denominator of the risk-based capital ratios.1 
More specifically, the reforms seek to reduce undue variability in 
RWAs, to make capital ratios more comparable and more transparent.
The areas subject to revision include the Standardised Approach 
(SA) and the Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB) for credit risk, 
and the operational risk framework. Changes have also been made 
to the leverage ratio and the credit valuation adjustment (CVA)2 
capital requirement. Lastly, one of the main reform measures has 
been to establish an aggregate output floor on capital.
In the case of the Standardised Approach for credit risk, the 
changes sought to increase risk sensitivity and reduce mechanistic 
1  The changes to the Basel framework published in 2010 focused, inter 
alia, on increasing and improving the quality of regulatory capital (the 
numerator of the capital ratios).
2  CVA is an adjustment to the value of derivative instruments, discounting 
from that value the expected loss for counterparty default risk 
(for instance, as the result of changes in a counterparty’s credit quality).
3  Under this approach, exposures are split between the part that is 
considered covered by the property and the part that is not; in the case of 
residential mortgage exposures, a risk weight of 20% would be applied to 
the portion of the exposure corresponding to 55% of the property value, 
and the risk weight of the counterparty to the remainder of the exposure.
reliance on internal ratings. To achieve these aims, the granularity 
of the risk weights based on loan-to-value (LTV) has been 
increased, for example, and an alternative approach based 
on loan splitting3 has been introduced. In the case of the 
IRB approach, the changes aimed to reduce complexity, improve 
comparability and increase robustness in modelling certain 
asset classes. The measures established include restrictions 
on the estimation of certain parameters, not permitting 
modelling of certain portfolios and setting floors – input floors – 
on estimates of parameters at the level of exposures (PD, LGD 
and CCFs).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Table A 
CHRONOLOGY OF REFORMS TO BASEL III REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
2009: Basel II.5
Higher capital requirements for the trading book, securitisations and resecuritisations
Dec-2015: FRTB
Completion of the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB)
2010-11: Basel III
More and higher quality capital, new liquidity requirements; new macroprudential requirements
2015-16: Post-crisis reforms to Basel III – Consultative documents
Review of credit risk framework: standardised approach (SA) and internal models approach (IRB); new standardised 
approach for operational risk (SMA); leverage ratio (e.g. G-SIB buffer); review of CVA framework
2017: Completion of post-crisis reforms
2014: Publication of new frameworks 
Leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements; framework for measuring and controlling large exposures;  Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR); among others
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BOX 2.6COMPLETION OF BASEL III (cont’d)
A new Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA) has been 
established for operational risk, replacing the four approaches 
existing previously and eliminating at the same time the possibility 
of using internal models. Thus the Committee aims to reduce the 
unwanted variability of RWAs and to simplify the framework. Under 
the SMA, operational risk capital requirements are calculated 
on the basis of a measure of a bank’s income and, at national 
discretion, on its historical losses.
Regarding the changes to the leverage ratio, a surcharge or buffer 
has been established for global systemically important banks 
(G-SIBs). The G-SIB buffer must be met with Tier 1 capital and has 
been set at 50% of the G-SIB’s risk-weighted higher-loss 
absorbency requirements (thus, for example, if the risk-weighted 
higher-loss absorbency requirements amount to 1%, the leverage 
ratio buffer would be 0.5%).
In the case of the CVA capital requirement, the internal model has 
been eliminated and two new calculation approaches – the 
standardised approach and the basic approach – have been 
established. In addition, banks with low exposure to derivatives 
may choose to set their CVA capital requirement based on their 
counterparty risk requirements.
Lastly, the Committee reached an agreement on the calibration of 
the output floor, which is the minimum value admissible for RWAs 
resulting from applying internal models, calculated as a percentage 
of the RWAs resulting from applying the standardised approaches. 
The output floor has been set at 72.5%.
All these reforms will come into force in 2022. A transitional 5-year 
phase-in period (2022-27) has been set for the output floor: it starts 
at 50% of RWAs according to the standardised approach and rises 
by 5 pp every year except for the last year when it goes from 70% 
to 72.5%. In addition, at national discretion, a cap of 25% up to the 
end of the phase-in period may be placed on the increase in RWAs 
resulting from the output floor. Lastly, banks shall be required to 
disclose, from the start of the phase-in period, the RWAs resulting 
from applying the standardised approaches.
Together with the changes agreed, the Basel Committee has 
resolved to put back the date scheduled for implementation of the 
reforms to the market risk framework, from 1 January 2019 
(the original date set) to 1 January 2022. The Committee trusts that 
this postponement will allow the introduction of the market risk 
framework to coincide with the start of the implementation of the 
post-crisis reforms, also allowing banks to develop the systems 
necessary to apply the framework, and in addition that it will allow 
the Committee to complete the changes being made on specific 
aspects of the framework.
Parallel with the announcement of the agreement on the post-crisis 
reforms, the Basel Committee published a discussion paper on the 
regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures. The Committee noted 
that to date it has not reached a consensus to make any changes 
to the current treatment of sovereign exposures; in consequence, 
the debate is still open.
The Basel Committee, when it announced the reforms, also 
reaffirmed the need for full, timely and consistent implementation 
of all the elements of the reforms, including the market risk 
framework. In addition, the Committee has established a 
programme for evaluation of the post-crisis reforms and has 
announced that it will actively participate in the initiatives of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) for evaluation of the effects of 
the reforms.
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3  MACROPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY
The map of indicators of systemic vulnerabilities1 at December 2017 shows that these have 
remained practically stable since the latest FSR (see Chart 3.1).2 
The map reveals a reduction in vulnerabilities relating to macroeconomic imbalances to a 
level considered normal or denoting an absence of vulnerability. This improvement reflects 
the positive changes in the indicators of this category, particularly the balance of the current 
and capital account, which is the variable with a greater weighting in the indicator used, as 
it is the most capable of anticipating systemic bank crises in the sample used. In any event, 
the risks associated with the current high indebtedness of the public and external sector of 
the Spanish economy should not be underestimated. 
Vulnerabilities relating to credit and liquidity also remain at levels free of warning signs. In 
the case of credit, this is mainly because positive growth rates are still not seen. Thus, in the 
absence of credit growth, the likelihood of vulnerabilities building up is very low. Nonetheless, 
the fall in credit is easing progressively, as explained in Chapter two.
Vulnerabilities in the financial markets remain low, owing to the relative stability seen during 
the last half of the previous year. Finally, the concentration of credit portfolios also remains 
stable and at a medium level. On the one hand, credit exposure to sectors more directly 
related to the last crisis, such as construction and real estate activities, continues declining. 
On the other, the more structural factors, such as the weight of credit to large-scale 
operations, remain stable.
Chart 3.2 shows the changes over time in the vulnerabilities of Chart 3.1 through a heat 
map. The heat map permits observing both the historical performance of the indicators 
used and the intensity of the warning signs relating to the vulnerabilities analysed. Intensity 
rises as the tone becomes redder, while green represents a normal situation.
The upper part of Chart 3.2 displays the same categories considered in Chart 3.1, with an 
additional breakdown by sub-category showing the changes in vulnerabilities with greater 
granularity. All the lines of this upper block in the chart refer to potential vulnerabilities. In 
other words, they are based on indicators that provide forward-looking warning signs of 
situations possibly deriving in specific problems in the financial system and the real 
economy.3 Thus, most of the categories showed signs of high vulnerability (red) during the 
periods prior to the recent crisis, whereas once the crisis started, the vulnerabilities 
decreased gradually.
1  This tool of the Banco de España draws together the information from more than one hundred indicators of po-
tential risk for the financial system and effective conditions of the real economy and the banking sector in Spain. 
The definitions of the main categories correspond with those established in Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 of the 
European Systemic Risk Board on intermediate objectives and instruments of macroprudential policy.
2  The map includes a set of indicators that are classified into five categories. The credit category groups indicators 
on the changes in and degree of imbalance of total and bank credit to households, non-financial corporations 
and the entire non-financial private sector; the debt burden of these sectors; the interest rates on new credit and 
on outstanding balances; and the changes in and imbalances of housing prices. The liquidity category includes 
indicators on bank and market liquidity. The concentration category includes indicators on total and bank credit 
concentration in different sectors and by type of borrower. The financial markets category groups indicators on 
correlations and interconnectedness between banking institutions and on systemic stress in different markets. 
The macroeconomic imbalances category includes indicators on external debt, the public sector and the current 
account balance.
3  The contribution of the individual indicators to the warning signs is based on their historical predictive capacity.
3.1  Analysis of systemic 
vulnerabilities
The forecast for systemic 
vulnerabilities remains stable
Vulnerabilities relating to credit 
and liquidity remain at levels 
free of warning signs...
... while those relating 
to financial markets 
and concentration are 
at low and medium levels, 
respectively
The heat map shows the 
performance of the indicators 
over time and the intensity 
of the warning signs analysed
The upper part of the heat 
map includes potential 
forward-looking warning signs
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The credit-related categories are the ones that reached the levels free of warning signs 
sooner (between 2015 and 2016). At the other extreme, the macroeconomic imbalances 
category only reached that level at end-2017.
In the lower part of Chart 3.2, the bottom row shows the situation of the economy and the 
financial system over time. The indicators included in this row do not seek to capture 
vulnerabilities that could derive in future problems, but rather the problems that have 
materialised at each moment in time. As can be seen, green is predominant during the 
expansionary phase of the economy. Following the outbreak of the crisis, the vulnerabilities 
of the first block soon fed through to the economic and financial situation, moving to red 
levels. Compared with the last FSR, a stable situation at a low level has been maintained 
following the improvement in the economic situation in 2017.
The update of the heat map at December 2017 confirms the situation of stability in the last 
quarters. Vulnerabilities remain low in the sub-categories relating to changes in and imbalances 
of credit, prices in the real estate sector, the debt burden of the non-financial private sector, 
liquidity and extreme events in the financial markets. As also seen in Chart 3.1, the 
macroeconomic imbalances category decreases its vulnerability because the real economy 
indicators have continued to improve during the second half of the year. In general, the map 
of indicators shows that the Spanish economy is currently situated in a low phase of the 
financial cycle, together with a gradual economic recovery. This situation is likely to continue 
over the upcoming quarters and, accordingly, the indicators are likely to continue reflecting 
stability as regards the absence of warning signs of cyclical vulnerabilities.
Against this background, the analysis of vulnerabilities does not advise, for the moment, 
activating cyclical macroprudential instruments. This coincides with the assessment 
published quarterly by the Banco de España of the indicators which inform the decisions 
regarding the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), the rate of which applicable to domestic 
credit exposures has remained at 0% since its implementation on 1 January 2016.4 To set 
the CCyB the Banco de España uses a framework of “guided discretion” under which it 
analyses the information from quantitative indicators in combination with an analysis of 
qualitative information and the institution’s expert judgement.
4  “The Banco de España maintains the countercyclical capital buffer at 0%”, Banco de España press release of 23 
March 2018.
Most of the categories in the 
heat map are in a situation 
free of warning signs
The situation of the economy 
and the financial system is 
at a low risk level, reflecting 
the improvement that took 
place in 2017
The most recent data 
available confirm a low level 
of vulnerabilities overall
Analysis of the vulnerabilities 
does not advise the activation 
of macroprudential 
instruments
HEAT MAP LEVELS (a) CHART 3.1
Credit
Liquidity
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Macroeconomic
imbalances
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DECEMBER 2012
JUNE 2017
DECEMBER 2017
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a A concentric line closer to the centre of the chart refers to a normal situation, while the higher the risk level, the greater the distance to the centre.
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The reference among the quantitative indicators analysed is the credit-to-GDP gap, defined 
as surplus credit in terms of GDP relative to its long-term trend estimated using statistical 
procedures. This is the indicator proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) and it has been incorporated into current European and Spanish legislation to guide 
the setting of the CCyB through a Recommendation by the European Systemic Risk Board.5 
Based on data as at September 2017, the gap stands at –50.3 pp, far below the level that 
would advise the activation of this instrument.6 Chart 3.3.A shows the changes in the gap 
level, in addition to the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend. It shows that in the last 
two quarters the credit-to-GDP ratio decreased proportionally more than the trend 
component, with the gap growing once again towards more negative values.
This increase in the negative change in the gap is analysed in Chart 3.3.B, which breaks 
down the change in its various components (GDP, credit to households and to non-financial 
corporations, and long-term trend). It is seen that, while the trend component continues 
contributing to closing the gap, both credit and GDP have contributed negatively to 
widening it. On one hand, the numerator of the ratio decreased because credit to 
households and to non-financial corporations continued posting negative growth rates. 
On the other, the positive growth of GDP has contributed to increasing the ratio’s 
denominator. As can be seen, this joint effect of a decrease in the credit-to-GDP ratio was 
greater than the decrease in the trend, which widens the gap. The trend component will 
likely continue decreasing as it starts to incorporate the prolonged fall in credit during the 
crisis years. However, the gap will only begin to narrow when credit starts to post positive 
growth rates above the GDP.
The set of quantitative indicators which the Banco de España monitors as guidance for 
setting the CCyB comprises, in addition to the credit-to-GDP gap, other indicators related 
to credit growth, changes in housing prices, debt service and the current account balance. 
The current values of all the indicators are fully consistent with the signals given by the 
credit-to-GDP gap, as no warning signs are seen in any of them. Therefore the analysis of 
5  Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV), Law 10/2014, Royal Decree 84/2015, Banco de España Circular 2/2016 and 
Recommendation ESRB/2014/1.
6  The Banco de España, in accordance with the Guidance of the BCBS for national authorities operating the CCyB, 
considers a level of 2 pp as the reference for a possible activation of the CCyB.
The level of the credit-to-GDP 
gap advises maintaining the 
CCyB at 0% in Spain
Foreseeably, the credit-to-
GDP gap will only start 
to narrow when credit posts 
positive growth rates
The current values 
of the complementary 
indicators used to calibrate 
the CCyB are consistent 
with its being held at 0%
Sub-categories of potential vulnerabilities
Credit
    Credit growth and credit imbalances 
    Real estate sector
    Debt burden
Liquidity
Concentration
Financial markets
    Extreme event risk
    Spreads and volatility
Macroeconomic imbalances
Current economic and financial situation
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HEAT MAP BY SUB-CATEGORY (a) CHART 3.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The colour scheme identifies four levels of risk: i) green denotes a normal, risk-free situation, ii) yellow indicates low risk, iii) orange is medium risk, and iv) red is 
high risk. The shaded interval denotes the period of the last crisis. Some indicators as at December 2017 are based on provisional information.
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this complementary group of indicators is consistent with the decision to maintain the 
CCyB at 0%.
In November 2017 the Banco de España published the annual update of the list of 
Spanish global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) and other systemically 
important institutions (O-SIIs). Pursuant to the regulations and timelines established for 
this purpose, the Banco de España identified the O-SIIs for 2018 and the G-SII for 2019 
and set the additional capital requirements to be applied to these institutions in order to 
mitigate or prevent the negative externalities arising from the size and complexity of their 
activities.7 
Five institutions were designated as O-SIIs (Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank, Sabadell and 
Bankia), one of which also has the status of G-SII, as in previous years (Santander). The 
capital requirements for global and national systemic importance are not additive; instead, 
the highest of the two capital requirements is applied. As regards the previous list of O-SIIs, 
7  “Banco de España updates the list of systemically important institutions and sets their capital buffers”, Banco de 
España press release of 24 November 2017.
3.2  Systemically 
important institutions
Five domestic systemically 
important institutions have 
been identified for 2018...
...one of which is also 
of global systemic importance
)a( )%( 9102 ni deriuqeR)%( 8102 ni deriuqeR8102 rof noitangiseDnoitutitsnI
00.157.0IIS-O dna IIS-GrednatnaS
57.05265.0IIS-OAVBB
52.05781.0IIS-OknaBaxiaC
52.05781.0IIS-OlledabaS
52.05781.0IIS-OaiknaB
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN 2018 TABLE 3.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Buffers for 2019 would be applicable if the corresponding institution were to keep its O-SII status, and also its current classification, in the 2018 revision.
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Banco Popular Español no longer has O-SII status as a result of its resolution and 
subsequent integration in the Santander group in June 2017.
Table 3.1 includes the list of institutions identified as systemic and the related capital 
requirements applicable up to 2019, when the three-year period of transition for 
implementation of this macroprudential instrument ends. The capital requirements are 
expressed in terms of Common Equity Tier 1 capital divided by the total risk-weighted 
assets on a consolidated basis.8 
8  For more information on the methodologies for identification of systemically important institutions and setting of 
the associated capital buffers, see Box 3.1 of the May 2017 Financial Stability Report.
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4 ANNEX
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ANNEX 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. December 2017 data.
b Difference calculated in basis points.
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS
The Banco de España publishes various types of documents that provide information on 
its activity (economic reports, statistical information, research papers, etc.). The full list of 
Banco de España publications can be found on its website at http://www.bde.es/f/
webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Relacionados/Fic/Catalogopublicaciones.pdf.
Most of these documents are available in pdf format and can be downloaded free of charge 
from the Banco de España website, http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/. 
A request for others can be made to the following e-mail address: publicaciones@bde.es.

